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PREFACE

This

thesis

is

intended

to

be

a

portion

of

a

larger

investigation of the relationship among war, diplomacy, and English
crown finances in the sixteenth century.

That investigation will

test the hypothesis that war was the central, defining activity of
kingship and, as such, shaped diplomacy, administration and finance.
Under this hypothesis, the disastrous fiscal effects of Henry
VIII's first two wars with France led to the disendowment of the
Church.

The conversion of Church resources to the use of the crown

was less an attempt to create a situation in which the crown could
live on its own resources than a short term policy to supply the
means to renew the wars.
or enormous reserves.

This required either enormous revenues

Under sixteenth century conditions enormous

reserves were more practical.

The new revenue courts of the 1530s

were the means to create those reserves.

They were kept separate

from the Exchequer and the Duchy of Lancaster not because the
existing revenue courts were inefficient but because the revenues
which the new courts managed were seen as extraordinary and
temporary.
The failure of English ambitions under Henry VIII and the
Protector Somerset, acting for the child king Edward VI, left the
crown impoverished.

Retrenchment and revenue enhancement under

IV

the Duke of Northumberland, acting for Edward VI, Queen Mary, and
Queen Elizabeth restored stability to crown finances but left them
essentially the same in revenue sources as they had been at the
accession of Henry VIII.

At least in this critical aspect there was

no "revolution" in Tudor government.
The decision to concentrate on the foreign debt in the period
1544-1557

was

taken

because

I

was

unable

to

discover

any

published discussion of the debt spanning the entire period and
because the topic is sufficiently limited so that a basic study could
be made without extensive use of sources available only in England.
I am grateful to Dr. Ann Weikel for making available to me her
personal copies of those volumes of the Letters and Papers of Henry
VIII not available at the Portland State Library, her copy of the
Acts of the Privy Council, and her extensive and detailed notes on J.
D. Alsop's thesis.

It is

unfortunate that many basic research

materials are not available at the library.
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CHAPfERI

INTRODUCTION
This is a study of a single aspect of English fiscal history
between 1544 and 1557.1

That aspect is the crown's foreign debt,

essentially all of which was borrowed and repaid in Antwerp.

This

study examines the nature of the credit markets, the reasons for
borrowing, the uses to which the proceeds were put, the mechanics
of borrowing and repaying, and the role of foreign debt in the total
scheme of mid-Tudor2 fiscal history.
Fiscal history is the study of government finance.

It is closely

related to both administrative history and economic history but
remains distinct.

Administrative history focuses on the structural

and organizational aspects of government as they change over time.
That is, it focuses on what government was authorized to do; who
was authorized to do it; how they were authorized to do it; and how
they were organized to do it.

Economic history focuses on the

sources and uses of wealth in the society as they change over time.

1Mary's borrowings of 1558-1559 for her war with France belong

analytically to the final phase of the debt ending in its liquidation in 1570.
2Mid-Tudor is by its nature an imprecise term.
R. Tittler and J. Loach,
eds., The Mid-Tudor Polity c. 1540-156Q (Totowa N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield,
1980), chose a period whose beginning is symbolized by the fall of Thomas Cromwell
and whose end is marked by the the accession of Elizabeth. I have chosen to examine a
slightly shorter time span, 1542-1557.

2

Fiscal history provides the link between administrative history and
economic history.

It is the study of how the wealth of society is

tapped by government to serve its organizational needs.
Fiscal history is of critical importance in understanding and
evaluating

the

options

government's ability

to

actually

available

to

act administratively,

governments.

A

diplomatically,

and

militarily is intimately related to its ability to raise money.

The

means by which funds are raised tells the observer a great deal
about the relationship between the government and the governed.
This is because the raising of funds is the area of administration in
which the interests of the governed and of the government are most
diametrically opposed.
Mid-Tudor fiscal history is especially interesting because of
the stresses imposed by the great inflation, commonly known as the
"price revolution" of the sixteenth century, because of the stresses
imposed by England's attempt to play the role of a great power
between 1544 and 1553, and because of the determined efforts at
fiscal reform made by English governments beginning in 1551 to
meet the consequences of these stresses.
Between 1544 and 1553, the government of England attempted
to play the role of a great power.

The ruinous policy of war with

Scotland and France pursued by Henry VIII in his last years and
continued by the Protector Somerset exhausted the reserves of coin,
plate, and land created by Henry VIII and his chief minister Thomas
Cromwell.

The sustained efforts to raise money for these wars, and

to service the debt they created, allows one to examine the full
array of revenue devices available to the mid-Tudor administration.

3
The
reform
system.

mid-Tudor

crown

government,

finances,

did

not

despite
establish

protracted
a

efforts

tax-based

to

revenue

The fact that the government did not establish a new theory

of revenue which would have permitted taxation to meet ordinary
expenditures left Elizabeth's government dependent upon the same
dues, rents, customs and extraordinary parliamentary grants which
had proved inadequate to her predecessors.
The failure of the government to create new sources

of

revenue adequate to the needs of a centralized administration goes a
long way toward explaining the survival in England of an essentially
medieval mixed polity with a functioning parliament and with local
administration in the hands of Justices of the Peace.3
To put the foreign debt in a meaningful context, this study
exammes the great inflation of the sixteenth century with attention
to the effects of price changes on the adequacy of crown revenues.
It reviews the nature and role of money and credit in the sixteenth

century, the Antwerp credit market, and the connection between
England and Antwerp.

It provides an overview of mid-Tudor fiscal

3There was a fairly great level of governmental reorganization in the Tudor
period, the creation of the Privy Council c. 1536, the shireing of Wales, and the
Council of the North being key Henrician innovations. The Edwardian and Marian
governments expanded conciliar government through the extensive use of special
commissions. Elizabeth increased central control through the use of appointed Lords
Lieutenant. Parliaments which had been nearly annual affairs from the late 14th
century to the accession of Henry VII in 1485 declined in frequency but retained a
monopoly of the right to levy taxes. The governmental structure Elizabeth left to
James I was recognizably the same structure inherited by Henry VII. That is,
government continued to rest on cooperation between the central administration,
which remained tiny, and local notables who served the crown in part to serve
themselves.
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policy,

administration,

revenues

and

expenses

with

its

primary

focus on war and war preparedness.
This context permits a detailed examination of the foreign
debt.

As we shall see, a key aspect of the price revolution was the

rise in wealth of the commercial sector relative to the agricultural
sector.

The traditional revenue system continued to rely on agrarian

rents stereotyped taxes, and fixed customs duties which did not
reflect this change.

The fiscal expedients of Thomas Cromwell and

Henry VIII did not reflect this change either.
however,

the

Privy

Council,

Thomas

In managing the debt,

Gresham,

the

Duke

of

Northumberland and Queen Mary found means to tum the wealth of
the merchants to the support of the state.
In doing so they temporarily relieved the crown of its foreign
obligations and set the pattern for the final
foreign

debt under Elizabeth.

This was

a

elimination of the
major achievement.

Coupled with the new Marian Book of Rates the use of the merchant's
wealth restored balance to the fiscal system and allowed England to
meet the crises of the last twenty years of Elizabeth's reign.

CHAPTER II
HISTORIOGRAPHY
OF THE
MID-TUDOR FISCAL SYSTEM

INfRODUCTION

J. D. Alsop said, "Since finance, quite properly, has always been
accorded a central place in the controversy over the existence of a
revolution in
possesses

government during

considerable

general

Henry

VIII's

significance. "4

reign,
This

the

topic

statement

succinctly delineates both the strengths and weaknesses of the
modern historiography of the English fiscal system in the sixteenth
century.

Fiscal history is seen as central and therefore has received

considerable attention, but it is not seen as being of independent
interest.

Rather it is seen as a critical example of a class of

administrative changes which either do,
"revolution" in administrative history.

or do not constitute a
Except for F. C. Dietz's

limited efforts on the reign of Henry VIII, the mid-Tudor foreign
debt remains essentially unstudied.

4 J. D. Alsop, "The Structure of Early Tudor Finance, c. 1509-1558" in C.
Coleman and D. Starkey, eds, Revolution Reassessed: Revisions in the History of
Tudor Government and Administration, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 135.
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SELECTED HISTORIANS
Here

follows

a

brief

examination

of

the

works

of

six

influential twentieth century historians as they relate to the midTudor fiscal system and especially the foreign debt.

A. F. PoHard
A. F. Pollard dominated Tudor history from 1900 to the 1940s.
He has been called the iast of the Whig historians.

"T""'l1.

1

•

•

•

ms is rrue m so

far as "Whig" imp ii es a focus on those events and deveiopments
which can be seen as leading to the "modern" and discounting the
importance

of

those

events

and

developments

"medieval".

This led to an unfortunate focus in his very limited

fiscal writings on parliament and direct taxation.
m the foreign debt was limited.

were

Pollard's interest

In his view it was deplorable.

Pollard was not sparing in moral judgements.
Edwardian profit on the debasement "fraudulent".
ivlary's reign as "sterile".

which

He called the
He characterized

His magisterial History of England from

the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth pictured midTudor fiscal history as a struggle between powerful and competing
interests: the crown against parliament on taxes; the shires against
the government on assessment.5
Pollard's Hegelian view of creative strife leading to a new
synthesis is not without merit but is extreme in deaiing with the
Tudor political, administrative, and fiscal system.

Between 1534

5 A. F. Pollard, The Political History of England from the Accession of Edward
VI to the death of Elizabeth, (London: 1919), pp. 186-187.

7

and 1560, this system survived three major and a number of minor
shifts in official religion, a minority reign, a female reign without
issue and with an unpopular king, a series of major wars, and at
least three potentially major rebellions.

This system passed on to

Elizabeth, not only a functioning government but a substantially
restored revenue.

F. C. Dietz
F. C. Dietz was Pollard's first critic from the perspective of
fiscal history.

He found Pollard's views "incorrect in detail and m

essence" primarily because Pollard over stressed the importance of
Parliament and Parliamentary taxation.6

Dietz's English Government

Finance 1485-15587 remains the only comprehensive survey of midTudor fiscal history.

This work, together with Dietz's articles on

the finances of Edward VI and Mary, Elizabeth, and James I and
Charles I, is unsurpassed for clarity and focus.8

Dietz was fully

aware of the importance of institutional and procedural change.
Professor Alsop credits Dietz with speaking in terms of radical

6 F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", Smith College Studies in
History, iii (Northampton Mass.: 1918), p. 71.
7 F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance 1485-1558. (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1921; reprint London: Frank Cass & co., 1964).
8 F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", Smith College Studies in
History, iii (Northampton Mass: 1918);
F.C. Dietz, "The Exchequer in Elizabeth's
Reign", Smith College Studies in History, viii no 2, (Northampton Mass, 1923); F.C.
Dietz , "The Receipts and Issues of the Exchequer During the Reigns of James I and
Charles I", Smith College Studies in History. xiii no 4, (Northampton Mass: 1928).

8
change.9

This is literally true but essentially incorrect.

Dietz saw

the role of the revenue system as follows:
"In the final analysis governmental revenue systems are
efforts to turn the chief forms of wealth of the country
most efficiently to the support of the state, with due
regard for the prevailing political idea or theory. Their
nature varies with and corresponds, sometimes tardily,
to the changing economic development and organization
of the country."10
This viewpoint leads logically to an evolutionary view of
fiscal

history

in

the Tudor period.

The

suppression

of the

monasteries was in this view a logical extension of Lancastrian
precedents.

Direct

taxation

remained

a

war

measure

only.

Debasement of the coin and alienation of lands were "unsound
financial expedients" to meet short term needs.

The reforms of

1552 through 1558, especially the consolidation of revenue courts
into the exchequer (1554), were simple cost reduction efforts.
Professor Dietz's greatest relevance to the debate on the
supposed revolution in Tudor financial administrationll is that he
placed the most significant reforms in the reign of Mary.

It was

9

J. D. Alsop, "The Structure of Early Tudor Finance, 1509-1558",in C.
Coleman and D. Starkey, Revolution Reassessed. Revisions in the history of Tudor
Government and Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 136.
10

F. C. Dietz, 'Finances of Edward VI and Mary', p. 71.

l lG. R. Elton made a Tudor revolution the center of historiographic interest but

he may have derived the idea from Dietz.
system in the Middle Ages much has been
far to the revolutionary changes made in
Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary",

"On the organization of the English revenue
written, but little attention has been paid so
that organization under the Tudors." F. C.
p. 61.

9
Mary who reversed the spendthrift ways of her father's and brother's
administrations.

It was Mary who carried through the consolidation

of the revenue courts.

It was Mary who brought the household

expenses under control.

It was Mary who made progress in reducing

pens10ns and annuities.

It was Mary who began to increase the yield

on remaining crown lands.

Most important, it was Mary who

reformed the customs with a new Book of Rates which allowed the
government,

however

wealth of the state.12

tardily,

to

effectively

tap

the

mercantile

Dietz's revolution is not a revolution but a

restoration of sound management which retained the best elements
of the administrative changes which had occurred evolutionarily in
the preceding reigns.
Dietz

is

the

only

major

historian

substantial effort to study the foreign debt.

to

have

devoted

any

His work on the reign

of Henry VIII is excellent and detailed on activity but almost
completely lacking in analysis.

The study of the debt between 1544

and 1547 was facilitated by the availability of Letters and papers of
Henry VIII.

Dietz states: "Henry VIII's foreign loans during the last

years of his reign are perhaps of more interest, than of preeminent
importance.

The activity of his agent in Flanders gives some

glimpses into the practice of international banking and business m
this earlier time." 13
the story.

This is undoubtedly true but it is only a part of

What was not of preeminent importance under Henry VIII

was to grow to very pressing importance under Edward VI and Mary.
12

F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 202-14.

13 Ibid., p. 167.
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Professor

Dietz

failed

to

identify

the

great

shift

under

Northumberland and Mary to relying on the Merchant Adventurers to
guarantee, service, and repay the debt.

In this he missed a key

aspect of his own argument that the nature of government revenue
systems

vary

with

and

correspond

to

the

changing

economic

development and organization of the country.
Unfortunately Dietz's interest in the debt declined as the
sources became more difficult.

He replaced analysis of the debt as a

separate item with notices of individual transactions for which
documentation
outstanding.

survives

and

with

summaries

of

the

amounts

The question of debt became subsumed into the issues

of exchange rates between the English and Flemish pound.

The

exchange rate was assumed to be related closely to the debasement
of coinage.

The debt therefore slowly sank off the page and into the

footnotes.

This is the pattern which has been adopted by most

subsequent historians.
Professor Dietz's work remains of great value.

His use of

sources and his methods of computation have been criticized by both
Dr. Challis and Dr. Alsop.

They each point out his excessive reliance

on summary accounts and his excessive concentration on regnal
periods.

Never the less both conclude that his work, while in need of

substantial revision, remains essentially sound.14

14J. D. Alsop, "The Exchequer of Receipt in the Reign of Edward VI"
(Cambridge, 1978) unpublished Ph.D. thesis, p. 283?. I am grateful to Dr. Ann Weikel
for allowing me to use her extensive and detailed notes on Dr. Alsop's thesis.; C. E.
Challis, "The Debasement of the Coinage, 1542-1551 ", Ec.H.R., 2nd ser., XXV (May
1972), p.454.

I I

G.R. Elton
G. R. Elton is the most influential of living Tudor historians.
His discovery of a "revolution" in Tudor fiscal administration set the
agenda for the debate on Tudor government for the last twenty five
yearslS.

This revolution began in the 1530s under the guidance of

Thomas Cromwell who, building on the reforms of Edward IV, sought
to make the crown independent of fiscal restraint by increasing the
crown lands at the expense of the church.
The establishment of new revenue courts which superseded the
Exchequer as

the centers

of fiscal

Cromwell's

revolution.

Cromwell's

advantages

of

bureaucratic

regular

administration

characterized

goal

combine

was

to

administration

with

the
the

flexibility of Chamber administration and to do so while eliminating
the monarch's personal control of administration.
new institution

of government, the Privy

The creation of a

Council,

designed

to

contain only men of political eminence, was critical to this process.
These men, whom Professor Elton describes as being of cabinet rank,
were the chief officers of state.16
There is much to be said for this position.

The household

system declined despite a brief recrudescence following Cromwell's
death . . Government through and even by the Privy Council was the
defining characteristic of mid and late Tudor government.

If the

15G. R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969).
16G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation. England 1509-1558, (Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp 201-229; Elton, England Under the
Tudors, (New York: Methuen, 1955), pp. 180-184.
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role of Cromwell has been over-stressed it is at least hard to
1magme the changes of the 1530s without his participation.

Having

said this, Professor Elton had very little to say about fiscal as
opposed to administrative history and almost nothing to say about
the debt.

J. D. Alsop
J. D. Alsop, one of Professor Elton's students, is a prolific

producer of articles
period.

on

fiscal

administration in

the

mid-Tudor

His doctoral thesis, "The Exchequer of Receipt in the Reign

of Edward VI" (Cambridge, 1978) remains unpublished.
numerous

articles

the

most

important

for

this

Among his

study

is

"The

Structure of Early Tudor Finance" in Coleman and Starkey, eds,
Revolution Reassessed. Revisions in the History of Tudor Government
and

Administration.

informative

This

review

administration.

of

article

the

includes

a

historiography

brief but highly
of

Tudor

fiscal

He places the growing authority of the Privy Council

through the 1540s and 1550s into the context of an administration
in transition.

While revenue courts were ephemeral, changes in

accounting and auditing methods were not.

This was in large

measure due to the low level of turnover of persons within the
administration, and the ease with which clerks as well as senior
administrators

moved

agencies of finance.
is

of

an

evolving

between

household

agencies

and

central

The image which emerges from Dr. Alsop's work
administrative

personalized, and orderly.

structure,

at

once

flexible,

As Dr. Alsop's interests are very much

13

administrative.

He has little to say of the actual sources and uses

of funds or of the role of the debt in mid-Tudor finance.

W. K. Jordan
W. K. Jordan is perhaps the best known historian of the reign of
Edward VI.

His massive two volume series, Edward VI, The Young

King, and its successor Edward VI, The Threshold of Power provide a
detailed overview of the religious, social, and political issues of the
reign.

They are weaker on economic history and very weak on fiscal

history.
Professor Jordan devoted one long paragraph to the external
debt in the period 1547-1550.

He provided a very competent

overview of the debt from 1550 to 1553.
the debt as

He saw the reduction of

the result of the brilliance of Thomas Gresham's

management as the king's agent in Flanders and the effects of the
restoration and calling down of the coin in 1552.

D. M. Loades
D. M. Loades is an historian of the reign of Queen Mary. His The
Reign of Mary Tudor. Politics. Government. and Religion in England
1553-1558, is a remarkable work.

The quality of research 1s very

high and the presentation very detailed.

While Dr. Loades is

primarily a political historian, he realizes the centrality of fiscal
administration to politics and government.
In three extraordinarily dense chapters he covers "Financial
Policy, 1553-1554", "Financial Affairs, 1554-1557", and "War and
Finance-1557-1558 ".

In paragraphs which frequently

reach 400

14

words in length he provides so much information in so little space
that the reader is often compelled to read the same page several
times.
Dr. Loades stresses the theme of continuity which we have
already seen in J. D. Alsop.
that

attended

continued

to

administration.

Mary's
play

Despite the abrupt religious reversal

accession
their

several

accustomed

key
roles

financial
in

the

experts
financial

These included the Marquis of Winchester, the Lord

Treasurer since 1550; Sir John Baker, Chancellor of the Exchequer
since 1545; Sir Edmund Peckham, Master of the Mint since 1546; Sir
Walter Mildmay, an experienced auditor and frequent commissioner;
and Thomas Gresham, king's agent in Antwerp since 1552.
element of continuity

guaranteed that

the reforming

This

efforts

Northumberland would be continued through Mary's reign.
retention
Cromwell's

of Treasurer
revenue

Augmentations

and

Winchester

courts
First

sealed
Fruits

rather
the

and

than

fate
Tenths.

a

distaste

of the

Courts

The

of
The
for
of

continued

successful management of the foreign debt was guaranteed by the
retention of Gresham.
Dr. Loades correctly identifies the key mid-Tudor problems of
cash flow

and war finance.

particularly useful.

His discussion

of cash

flow

1s

Payments by the crown, especially to foreign

bankers, had to be made promptly while collection of revenues
lagged woefully.

The crown was owed very substantial amounts of

money and these tended to increase over time.
size of individual debts was small.

Unfortunately the

Therefore collection of these

funds required administrative action quite in excess of the value of
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their collection and so revenues never could approach their nominal
rates.
War was a test of the fiscal system which it was not prepared
to

withstand.

expenditures

The
and

very

great

enhance

needs

of the

revenues

state

occupied

to

reduce

the

fiscal

administration to the exclusion of the issue of rebuilding reserves.
Thus when war was forced on the Council in 1557 the only source of
immediate funds was to renew borrowing at Antwerp.
Dr.

Loades

discussion

of

the

foreign

chronologically and interesting technically.

debt

is

detailed

He sees the increase of

the debt in 1553-1555 primarily as a political decision to pay
creditors in England in preference to continuing Northumberland's
policy of foreign debt reduction.

In this he follows Dietz.

He

correctly identifies the importance of Thomas Gresham's use of the
credit

and

revenue

of Merchant

manipulate and fix the exchange.

Adventurers

and

Staplers

to

Unfortunately Dr. Loades seems

poorly informed on the relationship between the crown debt and the
Adventurers and Staplers in the reign of King Edward VI.
to

misinterpretation

innovations.

of the

nature,

timing,

and

This leads

importance

of

D.. M. Loades has made a major contribution to the

readily available information on mid-Tudor finance and especially
the royal debt in the reign of Mary Tudor.

CHAPTER III
THE PRICE REVOLUTION
Mid-Tudor England, in common with its continental neighbors,
was experiencing the effects of prolonged inflation.

This period, the

"price revolution", was marked by a steady rise in prices and a long
term temporal decline in interest rates.17

In England the effects of

the price revolution appear in a staggering 64 % increase in the cost
of goods between 1510 and 1530.18
government

finance

about

1538.19

throughout the sixteenth century.
on the 1510 base.

Prices

continued

to

nse

By 1550 they had increased 154 3

By 1570 they had increased 190% and by 1590

they had risen 284%.
increased

This increase became visible in

War was among the activities whose cost

dramatically.

The "price revolution", while increasing the need for funds,
reduced the value of traditional sources of revenue including land
17H. van der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European
Economy (fourteenth-sixteenth centuries), (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963) vol II,
pp. 199 ff.
18E. H. Phelps Brown and S.V. Hopkins, "Seven Centuries of the Price of
Consumables, Compared with Builders Wage Rates", Economica, no. 92, Nov. 1956,
n. s. vol xxiii.

19 F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance 1485-1558. (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1921; reprint London: Frank Cass & co., 1964), p. 140 A part of the
cause of this delayed impact may lie in purveyance, the forced purchase of goods at
government established prices.
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rents,

customs

taxation.

duties,

and,

to

a

great

extent,

parliamentary

It also had the effect of reducing the relative wealth of

the traditional agrarian rentier sector in favor of merchants and
townsmen.20

As the crown was the greatest landholder of all, the

fiscal effects were dramatic.
The problems of crown land revenues were made worse by the
important function of land as a source of patronage.

Between 1510-

1519 and 1550-1559 the rents for new takings on the Herbert
estates in Wiltshire studied by Eric Kerridge tripled, those of the
crown increased 42 %.
same

period

rose

The Phelps Brown - Hopkins Index for the

by

160 %.

The

Herberts

may

have

been

extraordinarily successful in raising rents but, with the lag inherent
in 20 year leases, it is unlikely that they increased their total rent
receipts by much more than the 59% achieved by the Seymours.21
The crown's actual rent receipts must have shown a similar lag.
The creation of a foreign crown debt was one effect of the
increase in prices.
Staplers

and

government's

the

The emergence of the City of London, the
Merchant

overseas

credit

Adventurers
and

the

as

guarantors

increased

of

importance

the
of

customs revenues after 1557 are two aspects of the crown's fiscal
response to changing economic reality.
20E. Kerridge, "The Movement of Rent, 1540-1640", E.H.R, 2nd series, VI
(1953), I.

21 The effect is difficult to quantify. Kerridge argues against a decline in
landowner incomes but his argument focuses on the increase in rents after 1560. It
seems clear from his study that between 1510 and 1559 landlord real incomes, at
least in Wiltshire, declined on a per acre basis. E. Kerridge, "The Movement of Rent",
passim.
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CONTEMPORARY1HEORIES

Three main factors were identified as responsible for price
increases by contemporary and near contemporary observers of the
inflation in England.

Above all they saw enclosure as a cause of

reduced food supplies, increased unemployment and poverty.

The

next most important cause was debasement of currency which was
believed to lead to domestic inflation.
avarice.

Finally there was human

This was not really an independent variable but the driving

moral force behind the preference for sheep over plowmen, brass
coin over silver, and especially buying and selling over production.
The outpouring of Commonwealth literature from the mid
1540s

to

the

mid

1550s

demonstrated

the

importance

perceived crisis and the perceived need for reform.

of the

The essential

nature of commonwealth thought in the mid-Tudor period was that
the commonwealth men put the interests of society before those of
the

individual

and

sought

systematic

causes

for

the

"griefs"

afflicting the nation and systematic solutions to them.22
The centrality of "enclosure" to this literature was inevitable
m a country where at least 90% of the population derived the bulk of
its support from agriculture and in which competition for arable
land was increasing due to demographic expansion.

22 G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors, pp. 184-185.

The conversion

Elton notes a lack of
serious studies of commonwealth thought. A.B. Clarke, "Thought Word and Deed in the
Mid-Tudor Commonwealth; Sir Thomas Smith and Sir William Cecil in the Reign of
Edward VI", (unpublished MA thesis, Portland State University, 1979), pp.70-92
went some way toward remedying this defect.

l9
of common lands and plow lands to sheep pasture and the conversion
of open, that is strip, fields to contiguous blocks displaced farmers.
Complicating the problem was the uncertainty of many farm tenures.
Aggressive landlords could find means of terminating their tenants
rights.23
The

role

of

enclosure

remains

debatable

and

debated.

Professor Elton points out that there is little evidence of food
shortage in Tudor England except in time of crop failure and that
England remained, in normal times, an exporter of both grain and
cloth.

Enclosure was stimulated by the rising cloth market through

the 1540s and into the 1550s and then declined in importance.

The

areas of land involved were small and the bulk of land was not
enclosed for another two centuries.24
Enclosure

surely

dispossessed

some

and

caused

economic

dislocation for many but there is little clear ground for seeing a
direct causal link between enclosure and inflation.

Never-the-less

it was an important issue in the mid-sixteenth century.

The failure

of repeated government attempts to stop the process, most notably
the

Protector

commission in
sense.

1984)

Somerset's

attempt

to

reverse

it

through

a

1548, demonstrate that enclosure made economic

Kett's Rebellion (July 1549) began as an enclosure riot and it

23J. Youings, Sixteenth-Century England, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
passim, especially pp. 47-65.

24G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors .. pp. 231-233.
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1s normal to state that enclosure was Kett's main grievance.

It was

however only the first of twenty-nine enumerated grievances.25
The second focus of Commonwealth literature's explanation of
inflation, debasement of the coinage, was a more serious, though,
less emotional, charge.

In the sixteenth century coinage was one of

a number of competing uses for precious metals.

If the value of the

metal in coins rose above the price at which metal could be
purchased with coin there was a tendency to melt coin for bullion.
The cost of a coin is always greater than the cost of its materials.
This

was

especially

true when

occupation of skilled craftsmen.26

coining

was

a labor intensive

The value of a coin, if it is not to

be produced at a loss, must always exceed its cost.
se1gnorage, was profit to the government.

This difference,

Under the "just price"

theory prevalent in the middle ages this was perfectly reasonable.27
Therefore, as specie prices crept up in the sixteenth century,
the precious metal content of coins had to decline.

This process was

more advanced in France and Flanders than in England by the 1520s
25 A. Fletcher, Tudor Rebellions, (London: Longman, 1968), pp. 68-71 argues
that it was primarily a rent rebellion. He reproduces Kett's twenty nine articles
pp .. 142-144. It seems dubious to me that the relative rarity of rural rebellion in the
1540s and 1550s can be used as an argument for rural passivity. I infer from John
Guy's discussion of the importance of local magnates to Tudor government that he
believes that Kett's rebellion was the result of the attainder of the Duke of Norfolk
which left a power vacuum in East Anglia.
26 C. E. Challis, "The Debasement of the Coinage,1542-1551 ", Ec.H.R., 2nd
ser. , XX, No. 3 ( 1967), p. 443.

27 A. E. Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith (Cambridge Mass:
Harvard U. Press, 1923) p 61-64 provides a good overview of 16th century
G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors , pp. 224monetary theory before Jean Bodin.
226.
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and led to the overvaluation of English against continental corns.
This was probably the cause for the devaluation of 1526 and may
have

been

the

primary

cause

of the

devaluation

of

1542.28

Unfortunately for the future fineness of English coins this process
was also profitable to the crown.
Debasement began in earnest in 1544.

From 1544 to 1551, that

1s in the war years of Henry VIII and Somerset, debasement was
carried out not as a means of adjusting the value of the metallic
content of the coin to below face value but as a means of creating
profits to finance the wars.

The fineness of the silver coin was

reduced from 11 oz. 2dwt. in 1526 to 3 oz. in April 1551.29
October

1551

the fineness

of new

coin

was

restored

to

In
the

approximate standard of 1526.
The full course of the debasement of silver coin is shown in
Tables I and II.30

Table I shows the fineness of the mix from which

silver coins were made, the total face value of the mix of coins
struck, the seignorage or government profit, and the amount of coin
returned to the seller.
of fine silver.31

Table II shows the same information in terms

Table III outlines the course of the debasement of

28 G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation: England 1509-1558 (London: Edward
Arnold Pubs. Ltd., 1977), pp. 312-313.

29 All weights are Troy weights. That is there are 12 ounces to the pound and
20 penny weight to the ounce.

30J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement: currency and the Economy in Mid-Tudor
England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 11.
and amplified.

31 J. D.Gould, The Great Debasement p.12.

All tables are slightly simplified
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the gold coin.

It is noteworthy that at no point was gold debased to

the same extent as silver.

We will return to this point in discussing

the exchange rate between London and Antwerp.
TABLE I
THE SILVER COINAGE, 1526-1551
Starting
date

1526
May 1542
Apr 1544
Apr 1545
Apr 1546
Apr 1547
Apr 1549
July 1550
Apr 1551
Oct 1551

Fineness
of coin/ lb
oz. dwt
11
2
10
0
9
0
6
0
4
0
4
0
6
0
6
0
3
0
11
1

Total
Minted/
£
s.
2
5
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
2
8
3 12
3 12
3 12
3 0

lb
d.
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Seignorage
£
s. d.
1 0
8 0
8 8.5
1 0 0
1 9 4
1 6 8
1 18 0
1 12 0
2 2 0
1 0

Seignorage
To Merchant as 3 of Total
£
s. d.
2.2
2 4 0
16. 7
2 0 0
17 .8
1 19 3.5
41. 7
1 8 0
60.9
18 8
55.2
1 1 4
52.8
1 14 0
44.4
2 0 0
61.1
1 10 0
2 19 0
1. 7

TABLE II
THE SILVER COINAGE, 1526-1551
(FINE SILVER)
Starting

1526
May 1542
Apr 1544
Apr 1545
Apr 1546
Apr 1547
Apr 1549
July 1550
Apr 1551
Oct 1551

Total Minted/
lb fine silver
£
s.
d.
2
8
8
2 17
7
3
4
0
4 16
0
7
4
0
7
4
0
7
4
0
7
4
0
14
8
0
3
2
5

£

2
4
4

3
3
8

Seignorage/
lb fine silver
s.
d.
1
1
7
9
11
7
0
0
8
0
0
0
16
0
4
0
8
0
1
1

To
lb
£
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
4
6
3

Merchant/
fine silver
s.
d.
7
7
8
0
12
5
16
0
16
0
4
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
4
1
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TABLE III
THE GOLD COINAGE, 1526-1551
Starting

Total Minted/
lb fine gold
£
s.
d.
27 16
5
30
1
0
1
30
0
32 14
6.5
36
0
0
36
0
0
37
1 10
29 13
6
36
3
9

1526
May 1542
Apr 1544
Apr 1545
Apr 1546
Apr 1547
Jan 1549
Dec 1550
Oct 1551

To Merchant/
lb fine gold
s.
d.
£
27 13
7
28 16
0
28 16
0
0
0
30
30 12
0
34 16
0
0
36
0
27 19
6
1
0
36

Seignorage/
lb fine gold
s.
d.
£
2 10
1
5
0
1
5
0
2 14
6.5
0
5
8
1
4
0
1
1 10
1 14
0
2
9

That debasement was profitable is clear.

As the level of

fineness declined the amount of coin mix which could be made for
the same amount of fine silver increased.

Table I shows the profit

to the government through seignorage as an absolute profit and as a
percentage

of

the

mix

minted.

Why

it

was

regarded

by

contemporaries, and continues to be regarded today as inflationary
is less clear.

While some £4,300,000 of coin was minted between

1544 and 1551 most of it was in fact reminted from existing com.
Gould estimates the supply of coin at fiat as follows:32

32J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement pp. 81-82; P. Ramsey, Tudor Economic
Problems. (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1966), p. 118.
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TABLE IV
THE SUPPLY OF COIN, 1542-1551

Date
1542
April
Early
Early
7 Jul
18 Aug

Supply of Coin

1546
1549
1551
1551
1551

£847,576
£1,187,816
£1,754,867
£2,021,460
£2, 170,650
£1,187,850

% Change
from 1542
+40.0%
+107.0%
+138.5%
+156.1%
+40.1 %

Quantity theory suggests that the dramatic increase in the
supply of coin should have been accompanied by an equally dramatic
rise in the general price level.

This view was explicit in the views

of the anonymous author of Policies to Reduce this Realme of
England unto a Prosperous Wealthe and Estate (1549)33, and of Sir
Thomas Smith, author of the Discourse of the Commonwealth of
England.34

Ann Clarke has shown that Smith's opinions were the

basis of William Cecil's policies under Elizabeth.

That is, she has

shown that the view that the debasement was the cause of inflation
led to the Edwardian calling down of the coin in 1551 and had

33R. H. Tawney and E. Power, Tudor Economic Documents, (London: Longmans,
Green and Co.,1924, 1951), pp. 315-318.
34M. Dewar, "The Authorship of the 'Discourse of the Commonweal."' Ec.H.R.,
2nd ser., XIX (1966), pp. 388-400. Dewar has argued that this work is by Smith.
Her argument seems to be generally accepted at this time though elements of her
evidence are questioned by W. K. Jordan and more recently J. D. Gould. It is still
possible, though unlikely, that the Discourse is by Thomas Gresham or by some other
person.
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become dogma by 1560 when it led to the great Elizabethan calling
down of the coin. 35
Unfortunately,

while

price

increases

during

the

great

debasement were dramatic they were of a lesser magnitude than the
increase in coin and they did not reverse their direction after the
call downs of 1551 and 1560.

Price increases continued despite the

reduction in the fiat value of the coin supply and despite the
increased ratio of specie value to fiat value.36

This was contrary to

the expectation of the Commonwealth writers, to the expectations
of the government acting on their advice, and to the argument of
those who maintain that the debasement of the coinage was the
maJor cause of inflation in England.37
The argument that high prices
traditional.

were due to

avance was

Just price theory held that the price of an item should

be the cost of its materials, the cost of the labor required to
produce it, and an allowance for the overheads of shop and family.
Prices might fluctuate in times of shortage but were expected to
remam on average stable.

As long as wages were set by tradition,

statute, or guild regulation and materials were primarily of local
production this model was at least rational.

35 A. B. Clarke, "Thought, Word and Deed in the Mid-Tudor Commonwealth: Sir
Thomas Smith and Sir William Cecil in the Reign of Edward IV"... passim.
36Any claim that the price decline of 1558 was due to the restoration of the
coin should be treated with caution. 1557 was a year of severe crop failure not only
in England but also in Flanders and so the index for that year is abnormally high.

37 The Phelps Brown - Hopkins Price Index is reproduced in the Appendix.
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As prices moved remorselessly higher in the sixteenth century
it was reasonable for defenders of the idealized old order to blame
price

increases

speculation,

on

the

regrators

avarice

who

of engrossers

bought

and

sold

who

bought

on

without producing,

landlords who sought to increase their wealth above the fair yield of
their rents, and craftsmen who increased their prices.

This moral

thread dominated Commonwealth thought into the 1540s but then
declined in importance.

However it remained, especially in the

sermons of Latimer, Lever, and others a primary justification for
attacks on enclosers, engrossers, and debasers.38

MODERN 1HEORIF.S
Two major modern views have been put forward for the
increase in prices.

The first is non-technical.

It maintains that

demographic expansion underlies the price revolution.39

The second

is technical and views an expansion of the money supply as the
primary cause for the price revolution.
The demographic argument is that the population of Europe, in
the late 15th century, recovered from the effects of the black death.
This generated real pressure on resources.

Marginal land was put

back into production but yielded less for the same labor and capital

38G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation; England. 1509-1558 (Cambridge Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 321.
39see for example J. Guy, "The Tudor Age, 1485-1603", in K.0. Morgan gen
ed ..The Oxford History of Britain, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp 257265.
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inputs and so average productivity did not keep pace with growing
population.

This

resulted

in

real

scarcity

and

rising

prices

punctuated by famines.
The demographic expansion is unquestionably true, although its
full extent and timing may never be known.

It is generally accepted

that in 1348, the year of the first onset of the Black Death, the
population of England exceeded four million and was less than five
million.
million.

By 1525 it stood at approximately two and a quarter
Thereafter population grew at an alarming rate.

had reached three million

and by

By 1551 it

1600 it had surpassed four

million.40
The demographic expansion theory certainly isolates the most
important single feature of the Tudor period from the point of view
of social history.

It has the added appeal of placing our most

pressing current concern at the center of an historical problem.
Population increase put pressures on resources with which we are
familiar.

Whether it was the main impetus for price increase is

uncertain.
consumption.

It certainly increased potential market size and total
It must have acted as a stimulant to trade, industry

and migration from the land to cities.

It must have intensified the

competition between arable farming and pasturage and increased the
importance, at least in people's minds, of enclosure.
Having said this, demographic expansion alone seems a weak
basis for sustained inflation.

A case could perhaps be made for

40E. A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, The Population History of England 154118 71. (London: 1981).
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deflation as a likely outcome of population increase.
of money

remained

constant

while

the

number

Had the supply
of consumers

increased then the amount of money available to each would have
declined.

Given that their volume of transactions remained constant

the purchasing power of money would have had to increase.
not happen.

The purchasing power of money decreased.

This did

The money

supply was expanding not only in the narrow sense of coin but also in
the broader sense of coin plus negotiable instruments.41
It is possible that the volume of money transactions per capita

declined and that the average English person took less part in the
money economy in the sixteenth century than in the 15th.

This

seems unlikely, but the Phelps Brown - Hopkins Index shows a 42 3
decline in the real wages of building craftsmen between 1510 and
This decline was the result of prices increasing faster than

1570.
wages.

Such a decline is not possible in societies where people

depend on money income for subsistence.
England

it

was

possible

because

most

In sixteenth century
workers

had

other,

agricultural, sources of subsistence.
The second modern explanation of the price revolution is
technical.

It maintains

that the rise of prices was due to an

increase in the money supply greater than the increase in goods.
source of this increase in supply was Spanish America.

The

With the

increase in the volume of gold and silver in circulation more money
41 For changes in the coin supply and a very competent commentary on the
relationship of the coin supply to price levels see J. D. Gould, The Great Debasement:
Currency and the Economy in Mid-Tudor England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970),
pp. 71-86.
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was chasing the same quantity of goods and prices were bid up.

This

quantity theory was an aspect of Jean Bodin's writings in the late
1560s and 1570s in France.

Its current advocates include Professor

Elton.
Money is a complex subject.

Fortunately the sixteenth century

had not yet experienced the growth in complexity of monetary
components which we have witnessed in the 20th century.
a relatively

simple description of money

Therefore

is possible.

In the

sixteenth century, as today, money was a medium of exchange and a
means of storing value.
established by the state.

Like today, money had a fiat value
Finally money had and has a market value

determined by supply and demand.
All
barter.

commercial

transactions

are

in

their

essential

That is one good or service is exchanged for another.

barter requires that each party

nature
Pure

to an exchange have items to

exchange that the other party wants and which can be exchanged at
equal value.

This is often difficult to achieve for several reasons.

Only one party may want what the other party has to offer.
be impossible to establish an exchange of equal value.

It may

There may be

differences on the timing of the exchange and so forth.
Money was and is a medium of exchange which serves to
facilitate barter.

It allows a party to acquire the goods he wants

even when the other party does not want his goods.

By replacing the

unwanted goods with money the purchaser allows the seller to
complete the transaction by purchasing goods which he wants at a
later time from a different seller.
markets.

This increases the efficiency of

Money as a medium of exchange can be any generally

30
accepted form of token.

Cowrie shells or glass beads work as

effectively as gold coin.42
Money was and is a means of storing value.

Money can be

accumulated for future use or hoarded as a source of security.
Inflation tends to dramatically reduce the utility of these uses of
money.

Money held as coin declines in value.

One of the

consequences of the prolonged inflation of the sixteenth century in
England and on the continent was a preference for real assets as a
means of storing value.

Land, jewelry, and precious metals served

better to retain value than did money.

This had an enormous impact

on spending patterns of the monied classes and put additional strain
on supply.

An alternative to real asset investment was to lend

money at interest. 43
Money issued by governments had and has a fiat value.

That is,

it has a value assigned by the issuing government, at which that
government will accept it in payment of obligations, and at which it
obliges others to accept it.

This value is the domestic value of the

currency for paying obligations denominated in that currency. 44
42R. G. Lipsey and P. 0. Steiner, Economics, third edition, (New York: Harper
& Row, 1972), pp. 589-592.
43Jbid., pp. 590-591;
J. S. Duesenberry, Money and Credit: Impact and
Control (Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972), pp 10-11.
44See, for instance, Henry VIII's proclamation of 1 October, 1524 "The King
our sovereign lord, Henry VIII, by the grace of God King of England and of France,
defender of the faith, and lord of Ireland, remembering that at the Parliament holden
in London the 15th day of April in the 15th year of his reign, it was enacted, ordained
and provided by the authority of the same that all manner of coins should go and be
current throughout this his realm unto the Feast of St. Michael the Archangel last
past, at such value and prices as in an act thereupon made more plainly appeareth:
straightly chargeth, willeth, and commandeth that no manner of person or persons of
what estate, degree, or condition he or they be of, within this realm, from henceforth
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There are two important aspects to the fiat value of money under
sixteenth century conditions.

First, price structures were relatively

rigid.

For instance, most lands were leased for long terms at fixed

rates.

As land was the largest source of crown revenues any decline

in the purchasing power of money was immediately translated into a
decline

in

the

crown's

monetized at fiat value.

purchasing

power because

leases

were

Second, the value of coin was only

arbitrarily linked to the value of money.

That is, the teston was not

a shilling, it was a counter with an arbitrary value in units of
account such as pounds, shillings, marks or crowns.

Coin could be

changed in value by the government thereby changing the value of
cash on hand in an arbitrary manner.45
Money was and is a commodity and as such trades at a value
determined by its supply relative to demand for it.

This is true both

domestically and internationally although the two values need not be
closely

related.

In extreme cases, (e.g. the Russian Ruble in the

spring of 1992), a currency which is declining toward valueless in
international trade may be appreciating in value domestically.

The

government's ability to set fiat values, to regulate prices, and to tax
or otherwise regulate transactions can, in the short term counter

do refuse to take and receive in payment all such coins at such values and prices as
they be expressed in the said act, upon pain of imprisonment, and further to be
punished at his pleasure. P. L. Hughs and J. F. Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations.
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) Vol I, p. 144.

45 Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations. vol I, pp. 136,
146, 156, 158, 261, 264, 327, 449, 529; Vol II, p. 150.

141, 145,
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market influence on the domestic value of money, but, in the longer
term money trades as a commodity.46
The

international

value

of a

currency

relative

to

other

currencies is established by the relative supply of those currencies
available on the market, and the demand for those currencies on the
same market.

It was also affected by the specie value of the coin.

The value of the metal actually recoverable from the coin when
melted set a floor value for coinage.
In the sixteenth century the most important money market for
the pound sterling was Antwerp.

The value of the pound relative to

other currencies in international trade was set by transactions on
the Antwerp bourse.

These transactions balanced the supply of

negotiable instruments and coin denominated in pounds against the
demand for pounds.47
Sixteenth century observers, and many modern commentators,
confused money with coin and the value of coin with its specie
content.

The idea was that coin is money and has value because of

its precious metal content, not because a government says it 1s
money.

The mid-Tudor policy of meeting fiscal emergencies by

reducing the specie content of the coin ,

11

debasing the coin

11
,

was

blamed by William Cecil, Thomas Smith, Thomas Gresham, and most
others for a host of economic ills.

Their case is not proven.

None-

46 Early commodity theories of money held that money was specie and so
traded at its specie value. see Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith,
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1923) pp. 25ff;
Gould, The Great
Debasement. passim.
47The Antwerp Bourse is discussed below.
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the-less it was and is widely believed.48

There are two aspects to

the specie content argument.
First, in international exchange the specie content of com was
important.

It established a floor value for the currency.

failed one could always melt coins.

If all else

It also provided a convenient,

but inaccurate, means of comparing the values of different forms of
money.

It did not set the value of money.

As early as 1568 Jean

Bodin had realized that the change in the specie content of coin was
an unreliable predictor of the change in their value in domestic or
international exchange.

Inflation was outstripping debasement.49

We will see Thomas Gresham successfully restore the value of the
pound through restricting supply of bills of exchange without ra1smg
the specie content of coin.
Second, in domestic exchange, debasement of coinage created
uncertainty as to value.

Repeated debasement created a premium for

old coin as it could be sold to the mint at a premium.

That is, the

government had covertly increased the fiat value, the value at which
it will accept coin, of a portion of the currency without changing its
face value.

An old standard coin tendered at the mint could have a

value in excess of its value in paying rent.

Coin became less a

medium of exchange and more a focus of speculation.

"Better" coin

was increasingly withheld from circulation until delivered to the
48 G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors. pp. 225-228.
49 A.E. Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith, pp. 56-57 Bodin found
five reasons for the decline in the value of money. These were: 1) the greater
abundance of specie, 2) monopolies, 3) scarcity of commodities, 4) indulgence of kings
and lords, and 5) debasement.
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mint at a profit.

Each new issue of coin caused older, "better",

issues to be withdrawn from circulation.so
It has been widely claimed that the price revolution was the
result of the influx of bullion from the Spanish possessions in the
New Worlds1.

Unfortunately the bulk of that influx came after large

scale deliveries began to Spain from the mines at Potosi (c.1544).
That was too late to explain the beginnings of the price rise.

It is

possible to deal with this problem by citing the increase in output
the German silver mines

from

starting around

145052 and the

proceeds of Portugese and Spanish conquests in Africa Asia, and
America beginning at the very end of the 15th century .53
increase

allowed

an

increase

in

the

volume

of coin

This
without

immediately stimulating a commensurate rise in the production of
goods.

The flow of silver and gold through Spain then sustained the

nse for decades.

There are two problems with this view.

First, it overstates the part played in the money supply by
coin.

The bulk of the money by the mid sixteenth century, did not

50Gould, The Great Debasement, pp.7-33, provides an excellent , though
technical, discussion of the determinants of mint supply and the prices at which coin
would be tendered at the mint for reminting.
51A.E. Monroe, Monetary Theory Before Adam Smith. p.56 As early as 1548
Bodin de Saint-Laurent remarked "du temps de Lupolde, ce qui coutait cent sols vaut
ce jour dix livres, ce qui est a cause des pays nouvellement trouves et des minieres
d'or et d'argent que les Espagnols et Portugais en apportent."
52see J. U. Nef, "Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1618", Journal of
Political Economy. XLIX ( 1941 ), pp 575-591.
53G. R. Elton, England Under the Tudors. p 226; F.C. Dietz, An Economic
History of England (New York: Holt and Co, 1942), pp.104-106.
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exist as

coin but as

accounting entries.

credit, that is as

bills of exchange and

It was created by the posting

of entries in

ledgers which reflect the issuance of various forms of promissory
documents.

The most striking aspect of the commercial expansion

of the late 15th and early sixteenth century was the increasing
importance of the assignment of debts between two parties to a
third party.
The late medieval trading system rested on periodic fairs.

The

purpose of fairs was to bring to gather as large a number of
merchants and as extensive a range of commodities as possible m
order to facilitate barter and minimize the intermediation of scarce
com.

Therefore

restrictions

on

fairs

foreign

featured

the

temporary

merchants

and

increasingly

cash clearing arrangements.

suspension

of

sophisticated

Fairs might be annual, semi-annual, or

quarterly but in all cases they were periodic gatherings to exchange
goods and to settle accounts.54
While final payment in coin was the theoretical basis of the
system,

the

account

settling

function

was

critical.

Merchants

purchasing power was greatly enhanced and trade facilitated by
being able to purchase goods on credit for later payment.

Each

credit transaction created money to the extent that the merchant
could purchase goods as though he possessed coin.

This money had

only a limited effect as long as it remained a simple payable,
54R. Ehrenberg, Capital & Finance in the Age of the Renaissance. (New York:
Augustus Kelly, reprint 1963), pp. 307-311; M. M. Postan, "Credit in Medieval
Trade", Ec.H.R., I (1928),1; reprinted in E. M. Carus-Wilson, Essays in Economic
History. (London: Edward Arnold, 1954), Vol. I, pp. 61-87.
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theoretically due in coin at a subsequent fair.

The money supply was

increased by the amount of credit granted.

But, unlike coin which

can pass from hand to hand quickly and fund a wide range of
transactions in a short period of time, the credit served basically to
fund a single transaction.

That is its velocity was low.

The second problem with the specie based explanation of the
pnce revolution is that it ignores the effects of changing velocities
of money.

Here the revolutionary development was the assignment

of bills and notes by the original payee to a third party.

This was

initially a simple "I will pay you when so and so pays me" kind of
transaction

with

the

original

note

sometimes

transfered

as

security .ss
Again this had only a marginal impact on money supply.

Such

transfers could not be extended very far because the actual payment
had to be made to the original seller by the original buyer in order to
initiate a sequence of payments in which all debts secured on the
original payment would be settled.

The farther removed from the

original debtor one was the more likely it was that someone in the
payment chain

would

default.

Therefore

there

was

a natural

reluctance to take a bill which had passed through more than a few
hands.

At the time of settlement the money created was destroyed.

It would then be recreated by a new set of transactions.

The

velocity increase while important was small.
The introduction of endorsement created a major increase m
the velocity of money.

By the process of endorsement the right to

55Jbid.; van der Wee, Antwerp, Vol II , pp. 337-354.
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receive payment from the original seller was transfered with the
debt instrument.

This made the debt instrument into a currency

backed by the credit of the original purchaser.

This took control of

the money supply out of the hands of mints and put it in the hands of
merchants.

In theory money could be created at the whim of the

merchant who wished to extend credit.

A single grant of credit

could be multiplied to support a large number of transactions 56 .
That is, the velocity of money had increased.
This private creation of money was regulated by both civil and
cannon law57 but the restrictions and safeguards varied from place
to place and were, on the whole, ineffective in controlling the
expansion of commercial credit.

Governments universally restricted

the legal outflow of coin across borders.

They also aimed to a

greater or lesser degree to maximize the inflow.

This mcrease

rather than diminished the importance of commercial paper.

When,

as was frequently the case, coin could not be exported to pay for
goods purchased in a country, a merchant who was not selling goods
in that country would have to purchase, from a third party, a bill
payable in that country to complete his transactions.
This need to match accounts payable and receivable both by
country and by fair payable was a major stimulus to the financial
trades.

Banking, both deposit and merchant, bill discounting, bill

brokering, currency arbitrage, and commodity speculation grew to
unprecedented levels.

Market manipulations and panics punctuated

56van der Wee, Antwerp, Vol II., pp. 340-349.
57Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance , pp. 41-44.
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the growth through the 1520s to the 1550s.

Nevertheless financial

markets remained basically sound so long as they were engaged
primarily in financing a growing volume of trade.
The
governments

price

revolution

faster

than

by

.

.

increasing

their revenues

the

created an

expenses

of

environment

which made borrowing increasingly important to governments as a
way

of funding

expenses.

their

ordinary

as

well

as

their

extraordinary

The same innovations in credit which facilitated the

simultaneous increase in prices and drop in interest rates made
borrowing more attractive to governments.

CHAPTER IV

THE ANTWERP MARKEf

The decline in the rate of commercial expansion began in the
1520s.

It was in part due to the expansion of Turkey, in part to the

Valois/Hapsburg wars, in part to growing religious discord, and in
part to an exhaustion of potential demand for goods.

The slackening

of commercial expansion was roughly coincident with an increase in
the demand of governments for coin.
trade

financing

and

government

The operation of markets for
financing

were

fundamentally

different.
In sixteenth century conditions merchants showed a strong
preference for credit over cash.

This was primarily because of the

expense and danger of transporting coin.
relation to its value.

Coin was heavy and bulky in

The expense of moving large volumes, except

by water, could be very great.

Coin was also subject to theft.

In an

era when brigandage, and piracy flourished the private transport of
large sums in coin was little short of foolhardy.

The development of

fairs as centers of exchange had allowed the creation of clearing
systems

which

minimized the

use

of cash.

The

creation

of

exchanges to supplement fairs created a permanent market for debt
instruments thereby increasing liquidity.
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Merchants, unlike producers and consumers, needed very little
cash relative to their volume of transactions.

So long as a merchant

continued in business the bulk of his money remained tied up in
goods.

Merchant to merchant exchanges could be carried out entirely

through the exchange of goods or the exchange of credit instruments.
Only at the retail level did coin have to be received.

That coin could

then be spent on consumption, on additional goods, or exchanged with
a banker for a credit instrument which would then be negotiable.
Governments, on the other hand, needed coin.

Their expenses

were primarily salaries and the cost of items actually consumed,
whether food or gun powder, dressed stone or warships.58
pnce

revolution

expensive.

progressed

all

of these

things

became

As the
more

War especially grew more expensive at a rate which

could not be met by normal revenue.

Governments fought back by

fixing prices59, inventing new sources of revenue, and enhancing
traditional sources of revenue.

All in all it was a losing struggle.

Throughout the sixteenth century most governments expenses rose
faster than revenues.
Declining mercantile need for coin accompanied by the gradual
increase in the specie supply freed large quantities of coin from
financing trade and made them available for financing the pressing

ssw.C. Richardson, The Report of the Royal Commission of 1552
(Morgantown: West Virginia University Library, 1974) is an excellent example of the
costs of a government and highlights the great need for cash. Essentially the only way
for a government to function on trade credit was to delay payment of its obligations.
The political costs of such a policy were considerable.
59see for instance Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, Vol. I, p. 212.
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needs of state, especially war.
clump in war time.

Governmental borrowing tended to

Although most governments tried to live on their

revenues in time of peace the effects of inflation and the frequency
of war made it very hard for them to build adequate reserves to
When war broke out it would normally be true

wage major wars.
that

at

least

two

of

the

major

states

would

be

borrowing

simultaneously causing enormous pressure on the market.
Another aspect of governmental borrowing was that the sums
involved were almost always large.
a

few

banking

houses

could

This meant in practice that only
compete

in

the

market.

This

concentration of markets led to very close ongoing relationships
between

major

European

powers

and

their

lenders.60

If

the

government were dependent upon the lender for his needs it was
equally true that the lender, once he had committed a major portion
of his capital to a government, was equally dependent upon that
government's willingness and ability to repay.
a considerable degree above the law.

Governments stood to

It was therefore common to

have other banking houses, government officials, rich merchants, the
diets of provinces, and especially cities guarantee governmental
loans. 61
Loans from banking houses to governments could be of several
kinds.

Interest rates varied with the life of the loan and the

60The Hapsburg policy of making their bankers Councilors of the Empire, which
gave them considerable judicial immunity, and of ennobling them was paralleled in
England by the granting of corporate immunities to the Merchant Adventurers,
Staplers, etc. and the knighting of men like Thomas Gresham.
61Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 37.
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security of the loan.

A common device for raising cash which was

much used by the Hapsburgs but never by the Tudors were the sale of
annuities.

Annuities,

which

were frequently

normally backed by specified revenues.

perpetuities, were

These had the advantage of

not contravening the Church's ban on usury.62

Under conditions of

inflation the lender could hope that the pledged revenues would nse
while the annuity amount remained fixed.

The lender did not

normally have to involve himself in the collection of the revenues
but often did by purchasing the farm of those revenues.
rates on annuities were explicit.

Interest

That is the annual payment and the

amount of the loan were fixed and known.
Another expedient was the sale of tax farms.

This was to

become increasingly important not only on the continent but also m
England.

In a period in which governments were small and their

organization weak, it was frequently attractive to sell the right to
collect certain taxes, as customs revenues, salt taxes etc. to a
person or a syndicate of persons for a fixed term in return for a
guaranteed payment stream.

The sale might be for a one time price

but more usually involved a one time price and periodic payments.63
The most common type of credit transaction, after 1530, and
the one used by the Tudors to the practical exclusion of all others in
Antwerp was the Bourse, or floating loan.

These loans were for

short term at a rate of interest either explicit or implicit.
interest

rates

were

62Jbid, p. 43.
63Jbid, pp. 37-38.

governed by

statute.

The

Explicit

maximum

rate
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permitted at Antwerp was normally 12 % but the regulations were
suspended, or permitted to be ignored, in the mid-

frequently
sixteenth

century

to

facilitate

Hapsburg

borrowing.

Implicit

interest rates may either represent the entire interest due on a loan
or they may be in addition to an explicit interest rate.

The most

common form of implicit interest was to include in the loan the
agreement for the lender to sell and the borrower to purchase some
good, as jewels, fustian, alum, or gunpowder.

The sale price would

be artificially established at a high rate in order to increase the
yield on the loan. Interest was often paid in advance, and terms
rarely, if ever exceeded one year.

As these loans were frequently

rolled over annual renewal charges, fee penny, could raise the rate
of interest far above the nominal rate.
There were three major European money markets in the period
1540-1560.

These were Antwerp, Lyons, and Genoa.

Antwerp and

Genoa fell into the Hapsburg orbit while Lyons belonged to the King
of France.

Access to these markets was critical for raising loans at

competitive rates.

While the English government could and did

borrow from its domestic merchants and from such foreign banks,
chiefly

the

Italian

houses

of

Bonvisi

and

Vivaldi,

as

were

established in England, really large loans required access to one of
the major European markets.
There was a political cost involved in using Antwerp, Genoa or
Lyons.

In order to borrow and export coin one needed to have the

permission of the sovereign power governing the market.

Thus the

English use of Antwerp was dependent on the Anglo/Burgundian
alliance.

Heavy borrowing was possible as long as it served the
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economic,

political,

diplomatic,

and

military

interests

of

the

Haps burgs.

ANTWERP
The growth of Antwerp from a secondary port to the primary
entrepot and bourse of Northern Europe was due to three factors.
First, the decline of Bruges, after

1442, left merchants

business in northern European looking for a new center.

doing

This decline

was in part due to the silting of the Zwin at Sluys but mostly to the
violent political struggles of the 1480s.

The Emperor Maximillian's

official transfer of English trade from Bruges to Antwerp in 1488
was by means of punishing Bruges for rebelliousness.64

One should

not however imagine a dramatic shift from the old center to the
new.

It was not until 1518 that the Florentines moved to Antwerp

while the Genoese stayed in Bruges until 1522.65

The decline of

Bruges did not guarantee the rise of Antwerp but it did make it
possible.
The second major factor was that the town government of
Antwerp pursued a relatively

free policy to foreign

merchants.

Their dwelling places and times were unrestricted, and the business
in which they could engage were relatively unrestricted.

In Bruges

foreign merchants had never been permitted to reside year around or

64R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada. The Emergence of the English Nation,
1485-1588. (Harcourt, Brace & World: New York, 1966), p. 66.

65R. Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 233.
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to engage in the wholesale side of business, money lending, etc..

All

the more lucrative forms of business were monopolized by the
citizens

of the

city.

The

establishment

of resident

foreign

merchants in Antwerp and their active participation in and even
dominance

of

wholesale

business

led

to

a

concentration

of

international business activities not seen before or since in any
city.

Third, Antwerp succeeded because it became the center of two

of the most important trading activities of the first half of the
sixteenth century, the Portuguese spice trade, and the English cloth
trade.

Of these the more important in the early development of

Antwerp was the Portuguese.

The English trade, however, continued

to grow as the Portuguese declined and by the 1540s was the most
important single trade in Antwerp.
The Portuguese established their agency in Antwerp in 1499.66
When, in 1501, the Portuguese decided to decline Venice's kind offer
to broker her spice business, they chose their Antwerp agency as the
outlet for spices.

This trade grew dramatically into the 1520s when

the revival of the Venetian trade reduced its importance.

By then,

however, it had done its work in focusing European commerce in
Antwerp.

The spice trade brought together the merchants of all

Europe at Antwerp, but especially the Iberians, South Germans and
English.67
66G. D. Ramsey, The City of London in international politics at the accession of

Elizabeth Tudor, (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1975),
the decision to the existence of a major metal market in Antwerp.

p. 3

ascribes

67R. Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 233; The decline in the security of
seaborne trade in the Mediterranean following the fall of Egypt to the Turks, 1517,
and their subsequent expansion in the Magreb revived overland trade in the 1520s and

46
The Portuguese spice trade was carried out on the basis of a
single syndicate buying the entire yield of spices, usually in advance
of deli very, for cash.

This need to concentrate an enormous amount

of capital at a single point made Antwerp the financial center of the
North.

The profits to be made in controlling a monopoly of spice

attracted

the

counterparts.

Swabian

bankers

and

eventually

their

Italian

The spice trade was still essentially a mercantile

activity although the selling merchant was a government which
relied on the syndicates of Antwerp to finance its operations.
The presence of the main financial operators of the sixteenth
century in Antwerp increased the importance of the city as a
financial center.

At the beginning of the century these transactions

were primarily commercial.
increasingly governmental.

As the century wore on they became
The rise of government debt was due to

a series of events which each involved war.

The Hapsburg wars to

check the explosive expansion of the Ottomans after 1516, the
Hapsburg/ Valois struggle for Italy, the religious wars in Germany,
and the English wars with France and Scotland all required sustained
financing in excess of the revenues of the powers involved.

At the

same time these wars disrupted trade and increased the risk of
commercial loans.

30s. This would have made some northern European river Port the center of trade.
That this Port was Antwerp was due to the expansion brought about by the Portugese
spice trade. For a brief discussion of trans-European trade see G. D. Ramsey, The
City of London in international politics at the accession of Elizabeth Tudor, pp. 9-10.
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Essentially eight types of government loans were made on the
Antwerp bourse.68
Hapsburg

Six of these were primarily for the benefit of the

government.

government borrowing.

Of these

two

were

in

form

official

Bonds of the Court of the Netherlands bore

the personal guarantee of Charles V and thereafter of the King of
Spain.

They were backed by specified revenues and the personal

guarantees of officials, prominent merchants, and cities, especially
Antwerp.

The Bonds of the Provincial Diets of the Netherlands were

regularly issued in anticipation of aides, that is taxes, already
authorized but not yet collected.

They were secured by the proceeds

of the specified aide.
Bonds
intermediate

of
case.

the

Netherlands
They

were

Receivers
the

private

General
bonds

Rentmeister of the different Netherland provinces.

were

an

of the

the

They were, m

effect, moral obligation bonds of the Netherland's government but m
law personal bonds of the tax farmers.

As Hapsburg finances

weakened down to the default of 1557 they declined in security.

In

the 1560s large numbers went into permanent default.
The remaining three types of bonds were for the government's
benefit but were not government obligations.

Bonds of individual

cities were issued chiefly on the governments account.

They bound

all burgers and their property as security for the debt.

Private

bonds of high officials were frequently used, especially after 1557,
but also at other times of stress.

Being backed by lands and goods

68The following discussion of credit instruments is drawn primarily from R.
Ehrenberg, Capital & Finance, pp. 248-250.
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they

frequently

were

government borrowing.

more

acceptable

than

other

forms

of

Finally large banking houses issued bonds in

their own names, and on their own security, for the government.
That is, they borrowed money on the bourse and then lent it again to
the government charging one to two percent for their guarantee.
The only other significant governmental bonds traded on the
Antwerp bourse were bonds of the King of Portugal for which his
agent was personally liable, and bonds of the English Crown.

English

bonds were normally issued under the personal guarantee of the
sovereign, individual Privy Councillors and the City of London.
Frequently other guarantors were attached.
Merchant Adventurers

and

Staplers,

These might be the

other banking

houses,

and

individual rich merchants.
All these bonds were tradable but none of them acted as bearer
instruments.

They could not be transfered by endorsement.

amounts were usually considerable.
premmms over trade finance.

The

They carried substantial risk

These premiums of between two and

four percent could rise much higher during times of war.

The

premiums permitted bankers to borrow at commercial rates and lend
to governments at a profit.

This process put a larger number of

financiers at risk in government loans than at first appears.
1557

onward

the

risk

premiums

compensate for the real risk.

proved

to

be

From

inadequate

to

Of all the government instruments

traded on the Antwerp Bourse the only class of bonds which never
went into default were the Bonds of the English Crown.
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THE ENGLISH AT ANTWERP
The

English

cloth

trade,

while

less

dazzling

than

the

Portuguese spice trade, was the mainstay of Antwerp's commerce
from the 1530s through to the temporary shifting of the cloth mart
to Emden in 1562.

The trade was governed by a grant of privileges

of 1446, a treaty of 1467, and the Intercursus Magnus of 1496. 69
These treaties were a result of the Anglo-Burgundian alliance which
had originated in the Hundred Years War.
The organization of the English trade was through The Company
of Merchant Adventurers of England.

This "company", which received

its final form in a charter of 1564, was an outgrowth of the
Merchants of the Staple and of the Mercers Company of London.

It

may be said to have begun to form with a charter of Henry IV dated
1407 which instructed the merchants trading in Holland, Zeeland,
Brabant and Flanders to elect a governor to resolve their internal
disputes and to represent them before foreign courts.70
The authority of the governor was expanded by a charter of
Edward IV in

1462 to allow him to enforce the statutes and

regulations of the fellowship not only on its members but on "any
other person or persones not being of said felyship offending or
breaking any statuettes laws acts and ordinances. "71

This, in effect,

690.R. Bisson, "The Merchant Adventurers and the Tudor Commonwealth: The

Formulation of a Trade Policy, 1485-1565", (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Ohio State
University, 1987), p. 6, pp. 146 ff.
70Jbid. 7ff.
71 Ibid. p. 10, cites Cotton Tib. D. VIII, 43f.
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gave the nascent fellowship of Merchant Adventurers a monopoly on
the cloth trade in the Burgundian lands.
The importance of the Merchant Adventurers should not be
underestimated.

The company contained most of the important

London merchants.

That is, it contained most of the significant

subsidy payers of London.

London in 1526 already contained 11.1 3 of

the assessed lay wealth in

England. 72

It and the Merchant

Adventurers were also the primary source of indirect taxation.

From

1559 to 1563, under the new Marian Book of Rates, London accounted
for 88 3 of the nations cloth exports and paid 64 3 of total customs
duties. 73
The trade in cloth as organized by the Merchant Adventurers
was

the

most

important

trade

both

Netherlands in the period 1520-1564.

for

England

and

for

the

It was conducted on a regular

system with armed convoys being organized to carry the cloth to
Antwerp to sell at two of the quarterly Antwerp fairs.74

These

were the Pask Mart in the spring and the Cold Mart in the fall.
All attempts to reconstruct in detail the course of English
cloth exports are fraught with peril as accounts are fragmentary and
chronologically inconsistent, but it is generally accepted that in the
course of the first half of the sixteenth century London, that is the
Merchant Adventurers and their rivals in the Hanse, increased its

72R. Scofield, EHR 18 (1965), p. 508.
73Bisson, "The Merchant Adventurers", p. 44.
74van der Wee, Antwerp, vol II, pp. 183-186.
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dominance of the export trade in cloth from controlling something
over 703 of the trade to controlling between 85 3 and 903 of the
trade. 75

After 1552 when the Hanse was stripped of its right to

export cloth all of the London trade belonged to the Merchant
Adventurers.76

The brief restoration of the Hansard's rights under

Queen Mary was followed in 1555 by the prohibition of Hansard trade
between England and Flanders which reestablished the Adventurer's
monopoly.

During that period 1500-1551 cloth exports fluctuated

dramatically year to year but showed an overall upward trend. 77
The Adventurers had only one staple, Antwerp.

Therefore the

vast majority of England's main export was shipped to a single
destination where it passed out of English hands.

This concentration

of trade in a company whose privileged position was based not on
economic advantage but on chartered privilege gave the crown great
leverage over the Adventurers.

At the same time the concentration

of so much of the kingdom's wealth and foreign exchange earnings in
the hands of a few citizens of London gave the City and the Company
enormous leverage with the crown.

The mutual dependency of

Crown, City, and Company led to the fall of the Hanse in England, and
the cooperation, however grudging, of the Company and City in
funding the foreign debt.
75E. M. Carus-Wilson and 0. Coleman, England's Export Trade 1275-1547,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 18-33.
76D. R. Bisson, "The Merchant Adventurers", pp. 99-138 gives an excellent
summary of the last stage of the struggle between the Steelyard and the Merchant
Adventurers.
77see Appendix
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The dependence of the English economy on Antwerp, and the
dependence
finishing,

of
and

the

Netherland's

reexport

economy

of cloth

played

prolonging the Anglo-Burgundian alliance.

on
a

the

importation,

significant

role

in

Even while Charles V was

locked in struggle with the heretics in Germany he maintained close
ties with the main source of wealth in his Netherlands, the English
Crown.
The concentration of English interest at Antwerp made it a
focus of English diplomacy as well as trade.

While Stephen Vaughn

was the first official Royal Agent at Antwerp, that function was not
new.78

Vaughn, who was Governor of the Merchant Adventurers in

Antwerp, acted as a source of political diplomatic, and military
intelligence.

He also acted as the crown purchasing agent and as the

individual purchasing

agent of a number of Privy

Councilors,

especially Paget, whose white damask enters into most of Vaughn's
dispatches concerning loans in 1544-1545.
The undifferentiated nature of the services performed by the
king's

agents in Antwerp needs

to

be remembered.

However

important the raising and paying of loans became after 1543, the
crowns

successive agents,

Dansell

1547-1552,

and

Stephen
Thomas

Vaughn
Gresham

1544-1547,

William

1552-1557, remained

important merchants on their own account, and performed a range of
services as undifferentiated in their own way as those performed by
the Privy Councilors.

78J. W. Burgon, Gresham, vol. I, pp. 54-60.

CHAPIERV

THE TUDOR FISCAL SYSTEM
The revenue system that Henry VII acquired upon his accession
was based upon rents from demesne lands, feudal dues and incidents,
and customs revenues.

Henry's claim in blood to the throne of

England was weak but his complete victory at Bosworth eliminated
not only Richard III but most of his

Yorkist kinsmen.

The

circumstances of his accession allowed him to vastly increase the
royal demesne through confiscations.

Of the 138 persons attainted79

during Henry VII's reign 86 never had the attainder reversed in favor
of their heirs.

Their lands and property went to enrich the crown.

Henry's marriage to Elizabeth of York gave his seizure of the Yorkist
partrimony at least the form of legitimacy.
Henry
administration

VII

inaugurated

overshadowed

especially the Exchequer.

a
the

period

80

in

which

"chamber"

"ancient"

organs

of

state,

This administrative structure reported

directly to the king and depended upon the king for its efficiency.

79 An Act of Attainder was a Parliamentary means of dealing with those judged
traitorous by the Crown. The victim was corrupted in blood so that he could neither
inherit or bequeath property. See especially H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English
Nobility, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 38-75.
80 J. Guy, "The Tudor Age", The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984) p. 272.
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Under Henry VII, who was as much accountant as king, it worked
well enough.
The policy of increasing the royal estate was continued by
Henry VIII.

Attainder continued to play an important role m

enhancing the royal desmene, especially following the Pilgrimage of
Grace in

1536, with the suppression of the remaining

collaterals as the Poles and Courtneys in
suppression

of the

Howards

in

1538, and with the
Henry

1546.

Yorkist

VIII's

greatest

contribution to the self sufficiency of the crown came from his
acquisition

of clerical

revenues

and

lands.

This

process

is

intimately linked with the King's Great Matter, the termination of
Henry's supposed marriage to Catherine of Aragon, and with his
Reformation of the Church.
The results of this process of enlarging crown resources were
In 1485 the income of the crown had been roughly

dramatic.
£32,000.

By 1540 this had increased to in excess of £200,000.

ordinary

expenses

£145,000.
salaries

of the

crown

were,

in

1540,

The

approximately

This included the royal household and wardrobe, the
of

establishment.

officials,

the

mint,

and

the

peacetime

military

The surplus was accumulated in the king's coffers.81

With the increased revenue came a proliferation of revenue
courts to collect, disburse and account for the new revenues without
resort to the Exchequer.

These new Cromwellian courts were the

Court of General Surveyors, the Court of First Fruits and Tenths, the

81 F.

C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary",

History. Vol. III, No. 2, January, 1918,

p. 74.

Smith College Studies in
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Court of Wards and Liveries, and the Court of Augmentations.

In

addition the Treasurer of the Mint, the Court of the Duchy of
Lancaster, and, until its merger with General Surveyors in 1547, the
Treasurer of the Chamber were of major significance.
In theory each of these courts was responsible directly to the
king though in fact they rendered their accounts to the Privy Council
from the time of Henry VII82.

Also reporting to the king in theory

and the council in practice were miscellaneous fiscal officers such
as the treasurers for war and the king's agents in Flanders.
accounts

of all these officers were normally

The

audited and then

approved by the Privy Council or at least by one or more Privy
Councilors commissioned for that purpose.83
There are three salient aspects of this system.

First, there

was no separation between the government and the crown.

The

ordinary revenues belonged to the crown, were accounted for to the
crown, and their surplus entered the king's coffers.84

Second, the

complexity of the fiscal system was such that the king could not
personally oversee it.
delegated.
rather

The responsibility for oversight had to be

The practice of placing oversight with the Privy Council

than

creating

a

importance of the council.

separate
It

organization

had both

enhanced

a centralizing

the

and a

82J. D. Alsop, "The Structure of Early Tudor Finance", C. Coleman and D.
Starkey, eds., Revolution Reassessed. Revisions in the History of Tudor Government
and Administration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 160.
83 F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 78.
84G. R. Elton, Reformation and Reform pp. 214-215.
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bureaucratizing

effect.

Third,

the

system

reference to or dependence on parliament.

operated

without

The king lived and

conducted normal government on his own resources.

Regular peace

time taxation was, if not unknown, at least highly irregular.SS
Ordinary revenues were not expected to cover the needs of war.
To meet the cost of war the king might have recourse, through
parliament, to direct taxation.
types.

The

traditional

This taxation could be of one of two

form

of taxation

was

the

"tenth

and

fifteenth", that is a tax of one fifteenth of the moveable goods of
those living in the shires and one tenth of the moveable goods of
those living in cities and in the royal demesne.
become fixed at the sum of £32,00086.

It had however

It therefore declined in value

with inflation.
The second form of parliamentary tax was the "subsidy".
tax was more flexible.

This

It was a tax of two, three or four shillings

per pound on landed income payable in installments over two to four
years or of two shillings four pence per pound of moveable property
payable in two years, which ever was higher.
roughly £100,000 in the mid 1540s.

A subsidy yielded

Thereafter assessments became

stereotyped and yield declined.87

85G. L. Harriss, "Thomas Cromwell's 'new principle' of Taxation", E.H.R., No.
CCCLXIX-October 1978 passim., ably states this case. J. D. Alsop, "Innovation in
Tudor Taxation", E.H.R No. CCCLXXXII, Jan 1982 , passim, fails to rebut this key
point.

86 F. C. Dietz, "Finances if Edward VI and Mary", p. 70.
87 Ibid.
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These were not inconsiderable amounts of money.

A subsidy

collected in full over two years represented a 25 3 increase in the
crown's revenue.

A tenth and fifteenth represented a 163 increase.

The money was not available in a single sum or immediately.

The

first needs of war had to be met by the king from his own coffers.
Thereafter parliamentary taxation might afford relief.
were not adequate other measurers were available.

If the relief

These included

forced loans, sale of lands, sale of jewels and plate and borrowing.
War was endemic in the sixteenth century.
dominated by three powers.

Europe was

Of these one, the Hapsburg monarchy

was a traditional ally of England through the Burgundian connection.
The second, France, was the traditional enemy of England.
Turkey, was Islamic, militarist and expansionist.

The third,

England figured a

poor fourth, followed by a host of lesser but still important regional
powers.
Of the major powers Valois France was the most united, best
organized and best funded.

The Hapsburg lands, which included

Austria, and the Burgundian Netherlands and which stood to inherit
Spain, Naples, and Sicily upon the death of Ferdinand of Aragon, were
a chance agglomeration united by dynastic marriage rather than by
any feeling of common interest or identity.

The Hapsburgs were

chronically short of money even after the late 1540s when American
specie became a major source of revenue.
Hapsburg/Valois rivalry for control of Italy and dominance m
Europe dominated European diplomacy and war from the beginning of
the sixteenth century to the Peace of Cateau Cambresis,

1559.

England, the minor German and Italian states, and the Papacy a11
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played the part of make weights in this struggle.

The Turks as the

defacto ally of the French and the Protestant German princes on
their own behalf kept the Hapsburgs from decisively concentrating
forces against the French, especially after Pavia, 1525.
struggles England played a major role.

In these

Three times, 1511-1514,

1522-1526, and 1544-1547, England allied with the Hapsburgs to
launch major attacks on France.

Briefly, in 1528, England was de

Jure at war with the Hapsburgs.
Henry VIII's first two French wars, by dissipating the reserves
accumulated by Henry VII in the king's coffers, undermined the fiscal
stability of the English crown and led to dramatic efforts to create
a new reserve capable of supporting war.

THE WARS OF 1511-1514 AND 1522-1528
Upon his accession to the throne in 1509 Henry VIII enjoyed a
realm at peace, and amity with both the Empire and France.

His

father had left him a large sum of ready money and plate in the kings
coffers, a budget which ran a surplus and a substantial pension from
the King of France, the proceeds of Henry VII's intervention in
Britanny, 1492.88
While revenues were declining due to restorations of lands
previously gained through attainder, to royal grants of land, and to
the decline of the wool customs, the crown ran a small but
comfortable surplus until 1511.

This surplus was collected and held

88 F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance, pp. 56-57.
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as jewels, plate or coin or was loaned to merchants and princes.89
The full

amount of the accumulation

£1,800,000 90 .

was

very large, possibly

Be this as it may, not much of it was cash.

Plate

could certainly be rendered into coin at the mint but precious stones
had to be sold, and loans needed to be called in before they could be
spent.
The character and goals of Henry VIII have been much debated.
I see him as having three overriding interests.
the securing of a legitimate male succession.
critical until the mid 1520s.
king.

Most important was
This did not become

Second was a desire to act the great

Third was his interest in enlarging and consolidating his

kingdom.

The second and third goals led to war with France, first to

gain glory and second to secure control of Scotland, France's ally,
and to recover if not the crown of France then at least Normandy and
Guienne.
The diplomacy of Maximillian von Hapsburg and Ferdinand of
Aragon succeeded in bringing Henry VIII to declare war on France m
1511 and to invade that kingdom in 1513.

The results of these

efforts were modest, in part due to the perfidity of Henry's allies.
The fiscal effects were anything but modest.
Treasurer of the

Chamber for

wages

The payments by the

of soldiers

and

sailors,

purchase of stores, purchase and maintenance of ships, and for the
C. Dietz , English Government Finance, pp. 84-85, says that between
1505 and 1509 £87,600 were loaned to merchants, that between 1491and1509
£128,441 was spent on jewels, while at least £260,000 was loaned to the Hapsburgs
and their Spanish in-laws.
89p_

90Jbid.

p. 86.
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ordinance were £1,509 in 1511, £181,468 in 1512, £632,322 (plus
10,040 crowns) in 1513, £92,000 in 1524, £10,000 in 1515, and
£ 16,538 in 1516.

In addition the Lord Treasurer handled loans and

grants in excess of £65,000 to the Emperor between 1513 and 1516.
The end of hostilities did not stop the outflow.

The defense of

Toumai, captured in 1513 required an additional £40,000 per annum
from 1514 through 1518.91
To meet these expenses Parliament granted three 15ths and
10ths, and a poll tax in 1512.
in 1514 and 1515.

These were supplemented by subsidies

Another 15th and 10th was granted in 1515 and

the Church contributed four 10ths from Canterbury and three 10ths
from York.

Altogether these measures, which should have raised

something on the order of £450,000, raised less than £300,000 at
great political cost.92

The king's coffers had been drained of a

significant portion of their surplus for little gain.
the fiscal effects should not be overestimated.

None-the-less

Henry still had the

resources to be a major lender of funds to his allies.

The agreement

of Francis I to pay, over time, 600,000 crowns93 for the recovery of
Tournai in 1518 in part relieved Eng1ands financial embarrassment.
Had a sustained peace ensued there is no real reason to assume that
the crown could not have rebuilt its reserve funds.
91 Ibid.

p. 90.

92Ibid.

p. 93.

93 Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations. Vol. I, p. 145,

French
crowns in common with other foreign gold coins circulated in England. Their value
was set by proclamation. As of July 25, 1525 the value of the crown was set by
royal proclamation at 4s 4d .

61

The renewal of war with France in 1522 brought a need for
immediate money.

The slow and grudging payment of Parliamentary

taxes in the prior war made them an unattractive source of ready
money.

Instead Cardinal Wolsey, Henry VIII's chief minister and

treasurer for war, resorted to forced loans.
£350,000 were raised in this manner.

During 1522-1523 over

This sum still was £42,000

short of the needs of war and the deficit was made good by the
Treasurer of the Chamber.94

Immediate Parliamentary support was

necessary if the war was to be continued.
The forced loans of 1522 had been assessed as a tax on the
basis of a new assessment of personal wealth.

In 1523 Henry and

Wolsey asked Parliament for a tax of 4 shillings in the pound based
on the new assessment.

This was to yield £800,000.

turned mulish and granted a smaller subsidy .95

Parliament

Convocation was

more pliant granting one half of a years value of benefices to be paid
over five years.

New forced loans were exacted in the fall.

None of

this created enough cash to support major military efforts in 1524.
Hostilities were suspended.
Then, in February 1525, the French army was destroyed at
Pavia and the king taken prisoner.

Henry saw his chance to regain

the Lancastrian territories in France if he could act.
Wolsey's, response was the Amicable Grant.

His, or

The king required one

94p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 93-95; J. Gairdner and R. H.

Brodie, eds., Letters and Papers. Foreign and Domestic. of the Reign of Henry VIII.
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, various), III, 2750

95 Letters and Papers
Finance. p. 94.

III, 3082; IV, 377;

Dietz, English Government
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sixth of a man's property to allow him "to conserve the honor of the
realm and recover the crown of France".

Opposition was general.

There were still commissioners at large collecting the loans of
1522, and commissioners collecting the subsidy of 1523.

Now a

third set of commissioners was sent to the same people. 96

In the

face of what came close to rebellion Henry and Wolsey withdrew the
grant.97
Peace had to be made, for the Imperials, under Charles V were
unable to attack France. 98

Wolsey made good use of the peace

negotiations to extract financial concessions from France.

The

French pension of 50,000 crowns per year from the Treaty of Etaples
was to continue with arrears paid up and, in addition, the French
crown agreed to pay another 50,000 crowns per year as indemnity
and to cover miscellaneous debts of the French to Henry.99
96Elton, England Under the Tudors. p 78;
pp. 94-95, Letters and Papers, III, 3082.

Dietz, English Government Finance.

97Letters and Papers IV, 1235,
The assembly of 20,000 men in Norfolk was
dealt with by the Dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk. In 1549 the removal of these noblemen
by attainder facilitated Kett's Rebellion.
98The battle of Pavia had been precipitated by the choice between dispersing
the Imperial army for lack of funds or attacking. Now the defeat of the French had
restored the imperial credit but the peasants war in Germany required immediate
suppression and Louis of Hungary needed help against the Turks. The peasants were
suppressed but Hungary was crushed at Mohac in 1526. Charles V's brother Ferdinand
was elected King of Hungary and the Hapsburgs were saddled with the Crown of
Hungary and an endless struggle with the Turks. In addition Charles V broke his
engagement with Henry's younger sister Princess Mary to wed the heiress to
Portugal. Henry must have felt betrayed by his countrymen and doubly betrayed by
his allies. A good basic treatment of this period is given in P.S. Crowson, Tudor
Foreign Policy, (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973), pp. 59-73.
99Letters and Papers II, 4476; III, 199; III 1508
Finance. p. 100.

Dietz, English Government
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In April 1527 Henry joined Francis in the League of Cognac
against the Hapsburgs.
diplomacy.

This

was the high point of Wolsey's

Francis, no doubt desperate for allies, agreed to yet

another pension.

This time he was to pay 50,000 crowns per year in

perpetuity to Henry's heirs as in recompense for the Valois holding
the crown of France.

In addition Henry was to receive 15,000

crowns worth of black salt per annum.

Henry had won, if not the

crown of France, at least the illusion that his claim to France was
acknowledged by the King of France.

100

In January 1528 England was de jure at war with the Empire.
In fact hostilities never commenced.

By March trade had been

resumed at Antwerp and in June a truce was made excluding Italy.
This farcical war had the real cost of suspending Henry's French
pension payments and requiring Henry to supply the French with
approximately £60,000 in cash and jewels.

England, exhausted could

do no more.101
The destruction of another French army in Italy in 1529 might
have left both Francis and Henry fatally compromised had not the
Turks besieged Vienna and the Lutheran Princes raised their famed
Protest against the Interim at the Second Diet of Speyer.102

Peace

was made by both parties with the Hapsburgs.
lOODietz, English Government Finance. pp. 100-101.
IOlwernham, Before the Armada,

p. 118-119.

102This was an imposed temporary settlement of religious issues to last until
a general council of the church. It, in effect, violated the principle of the First Diet of
Speyer that the princes should control religion in their territories pending a general
council of the church.
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Henry

VIII's

fifteen years

of war had left him with

an

impoverished treasury, a disaffected populace, and a French alliance.
His fiscal gains were composed primarily of pensions which bound
him to the French alliance.

The failure to pay the pensions would be

doubly dangerous for Henry as it would not only signal a renewal of
French hostility but also reduce his ability to wage war.
THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 1528-1542
The failure of Charles V to place Henry VIII on the French
throne following Pavia and the jilting of Henry's sister, Princess
Mary,

were the first two steps toward the dissolution

Hapsburg/Tudor entente.

of the

The third, and decisive step was Henry's

decision to put aside his queen, Catherine of Aragon, aunt of Charles
V, in favor of Anne Bolyne.

Conservatives, like Stephen Gardiner,

Bishop of Winchester, lost power and opportunists like Thomas
Cromwell rose to power.
On July 11, 1533, Henry VIII was excommunicated but the
excommunication

was

suspended

to

permit

a

resolution.

Maneuvering continued with Henry increasing his pressure on the
interests of the papacy.

From 1534 through 1538 Henry VIII's

government, under the direction of Thomas Cromwell, moved to take
control of the Church away from Rome and vest it in the crown.
1534 saw Parliament used as a tool to strip Rome of its power
in England.

The Act in Restraint of Appeals established the principle

that "England is an Empire" thereby terminating appeals to Rome.
The Act in Restraint of Annates ended payments to Rome for the
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consecration of bishops and a very few abbots.

The Dispensation Act

moved revenues from dispensations to the Exchequer.

The Act of

Succession removed the Princess Mary, daughter of Catherine of
Aragon,

from

the succession

daughter of Ann Bolyne.

and replaced

her with Elizabeth,

The Act of First Fruits and Tenths

established regular royal taxation of the church and increased the
The Act of Supremacy vested

royal revenues by £40,000 per annum.

control of the Church in the person of the monarch as "supreme
head", authorized royal visitations and moved appeals of cannon law
cases out of convocation to chancery.

Finally the Statute of

Treasons made it treason to call the king, heretic or schismatic, and
to fail to swear the Act of Succession.
This was an enormous legislative program with major fiscal
ramifications.
complete.

The royal assertion of authority over the Church was

The king's coffers were swelled by the imposition of an

annual income tax (tenths), and an entry fine on benefices (annates).
The Exchequer benefited marginally from dispensations.
power

of the

endowments.
Henry's
valuation

of

church

lay

in

its

great

institutions

Still, the
and

their

These remained untouched.
decision

to

monasteries

carry

on

in

1535

with

the

coupled

visitation
with

the

of and
Pope's

exasperated decision to depose Henry and call on the French to stand
ready to enforce the deposition brought doom to the monasteries and
began a series of invasion fears which lasted through 1540.
Under

the

circumstances

Henry

VIIl's

government

had

a

pressing need for money both to increase the level of preparedness
and to augment cash reserves in case of the sudden outbreak of war.
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The Tudor fiscal system of 1534 was not well adapted to achieving
either of these ends.

Normal revenues were too fixed

while

Parliamentary grants took too long to authorize and collect.

One

possible solution to this problem lay in transfering the assets of the
church to the crown.

Another possible solution lay in changing the

basis of taxation to allow easier levying and faster collection.

Both

these options were to be exploited.
The period of cold war which followed Henry VIII's break with
the Hapsburgs in 1528 and the suspended excommunication of 1533
imposed considerable immediate strain on the Tudor fiscal system.
The coffers had been emptied by war.
expenses was very small.
as great.

The surplus over ordinary

The danger of sudden war was perceived

The need to both fortify the realm and build reserves was

therefore pressing.

Thomas Cromwell and Henry therefore began a

new effort to raise Parliamentary taxation.
This innovative, if not

entirely

unprecedented,

raise taxes in time of peace failed in 1532.

attempt to

In 1534, however, and

agam in 1540 subsidy acts were carried in time of peace.

The act of

1534 and 1540 both rested their case primarily on the needs of
defense but the act of 1534 also called for relief of the past
"excessyve and inestimable charges" of the crown.

The 1540 act

sought relief for the charges in establishing the councils of the
North, the Welsh Marches and the West.

That is the two acts

together began to establish a precedent for Parliamentary relief of
past

expenses

expenses.

and

of ongoing

non-war

and

even

non-defense

This was the beginning of a gradual process by which

ordinary expenses to be paid by ordinary revenues shrank to being
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the minimum expenses of Henry VII while extraordinary grew to
encompass all other expenses.103

This process remained in its
Non-war

infancy through the reigns of Edward VI and of Mary.

Parliamentary taxation was extremely unlikely to meet Henry VIIl's
needs in the 1540s.
How far the dissolution of the monasteries and the addition of
the lands and plate to the royal estate was a matter of planned
policy and how much a reaction to the pressing needs of the moment
is unclear.104

In either case Henry's government proceeded with

caution and under the form of law.

In 1536 only small monasteries,

those with rent rolls less than £200 per annum, were suppressed.
The great houses remained under threat but untouched.

However the

threat to them coupled with the papal deposition and changes in
religion under the Ten Acts of July 1536 sparked rebellion in the
north.

The Pilgrimage of Grace and Bigod's Rebellion posed a

significant threat to Henry which he met with a fine mix of force,
deceit,

and

monasteries.

reprisal.

Their

failure

sealed

the

fate

of

the

A palliative retreat on the sacraments in 1537 was

followed by a new visitation and suppression of the monasteries in
1538

and

by

the

September

Injunctions

against

icons

and

pilgrimages and for the use of English in religious services.
103J. D. Alsop, "The Theory of Tudor Taxation", passim.
104 Professor Elton sees the dissolution as a part of a policy of reendowing
the crown which originated with Thomas Cromwell. In this he differs from Professor
Dietz who saw Cromwell's role not as a formulator of policy, the policy being Edward
IV's, but as a provider of means. I see it as an emergency measure to provide war
funding.and to eliminate the primary source of potential opposition to Henry's divorce
and remarriage.
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The

suppression

government.

had

three

positive

for

Henry's

First, it delivered as much as £3,000,000 in land and

£80,000 in plate and jewels to the crown ..105
for

effects

through

a

Augmentations.

new

statutory

revenue

These were accounted
court,

the

Court

of

Second, the wealth and manpower of the church was

suddenly and effectively reduced below the level at which it could
pose

a

realistic

threat

as

a

focus

of rebellion.

Third,

the

suppression of the monasteries removed from the Parliament all
mitred abbots thereby establishing a large permanent lay majority
in Lords.

Fourth, it provided Henry with an enormous increment to

the lands distributable as patronage.106
The activities of Thomas Cromwell had achieved a marked
improvement

in

the

state

of the

King's

revenue.

The

pre-

Cromwellian revenues of the crown remained substantial.

The

decline

and

of Exchequer revenue,

derived

from

the

customs

miscellaneous feudal charges, from £40,000 to £30,000 after 1540
is due to accounting changes in the Wardrobe.

The Court of General

Surveyors continued to clear approximately £38,000 per annum.

The

105F. C. Dietz , English Government Finance. p. 137-140 , cites Cott. Mss.,
Cleopatra E. IV 446-456 as estimating a yearly value of £135,000 on land. At a
Henrician sale price of 20 years rent that would place the value at approximately
£2. 7 million. At no time did the Court of Augmentations ever take in so much rent in
one year.
106F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 148 Between 1536 and March
1539 estates valued at £11,633 a year were alienated "chiefly to men in service to
the crown, like Pope, Sadler, Wriothesley, Seymour, Go stick and Cromwell".
In
return the crown received £46,000 and some lands. Had these lands been sold at the
prices prevailing after March 1539 they would have yielded in excess of £200,000.
For grants of land to the nobility in this period see H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English
Nobility, pp. 221-253.
She says "All recipients were important office-holders or
men well known to Henry VIII through their service at court."
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Duchy of Lancaster contributed £13,000.
have averaged £8,500.

Wards and Liveries may

Including charges collected and expended

locally the normal revenue of Henry VIII in 1540 before the additions
made by Cromwell cannot have been much less than £100,000 per
annum.107
Cromwell's
increment.

new

revenue

courts

provided

an

impressive

First Fruits and Tenths handled not only the entry fines

for benefices, first fruits, and the tithe on church revenues, tenths,
but also clerical subsidies.

Including £130,000 transfered into it in

1535, this court's average contribution to the royal revenue was
approximately £52,000 per annum from

1535 through

1539 and

nearly £70,000 from 1540 through 1546.108
Augmentations is a more difficult study.
Augmentations

was

largely

involved

with

This is because

selling

lands

continuing basis but with major peaks of activity in war years.

on

a
Net

receipts of the Court of Augmentations were £108,028 for 1538/39.
In the four years 1539/40-1542/43 they averaged £116,421.
1543/44 they rose to £253,312.
£139,152.

In

In

1544/45 they declined to

In 1545/46 they were only £66,186.

Professor Dietz

calculated that the real average yield from rents through this period
was £61,300.

The rest of the revenue derived primarily from land

sales with a small addition for sales of goods.109

107p_ C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 137ff.
108Jbid.
109Jbid.
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While Irish wars, defense preparations, the expenses of palace
building, and an expanding household all put new stresses on the
revenue, the king's coffers began to swell.

Between 1535 and 1539

the treasurer of First Fruits and Tenths transfered £59,139 to the
coffers.

The Court of Augmentations contributed £119,270 between

April 1536 and March 1540.

The subsidy and fifteenth and tenth of

1534 seems to have passed directly into the coffers providing
perhaps

another £77 ,000.

All in

all Henry's ready

resources

increased by at least £250,000 from the suppression of the small
monasteries to 1540.110
The rapprochement between France and the Hapsburgs which
began in 1537 with a truce raised invasion fears to new heights.

As

long as the two main continental powers had been at war England had
been safe.

In December 1537 a Papal bull of deprivation was

promulgated

in

Rome.

It

seemed

at least possible that

continental powers might unite to depose Henry.

the

The war scare

reached a peak in 1539 when Francis and Charles agreed to make no
separate

agreements

with

England.

Thereafter the

continental

powers drifted back into hostility.
Although Henry mustered men, built blockhouses and readied
ninety ships of war his real effort was diplomatic.

Cromwell sought

a defensive pact with the German Protestant princes and sealed it
with the marriage of Henry to Ann of Cleves, whose father not only
controlled the lower Rhine but also disputed control of Gelderland
with Charles V.
1 lOJbid.

At the same time the Emperor was offered an
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alliance and Francis the cancellation of some or all of the French
pensions which had not been paid since 1534.111
The
revenue.

period

1540-1542

saw

strenuous

efforts

to

increase

The Parliament of 1540 passed three major revenue acts.

These suppressed the Knights Hospitalers and expropriated their
possessions, granted a subsidy to be paid over two years and four
fifteenths and tenths to be paid over four years, and confirmed the
offer of the Convocations of Canterbury and York to pay four
shillings in the pound on their revenues over the next two years. 112
Henry also benefited in 1539-1541 from attainders.

The attainder

of Thomas Cromwell was followed by those of Lord Grey, the
Countess of Salisbury, Sir John Neville, Lord Dacre of the South, and
Mr. Mantell.113
In

1542 Henry returned to raising forced loans with the

"Benevolent Grant" and in 1543 obtained an additional lay subsidy
and an additional clerical subsidy.

Finally, in 1543 he made a final

attempt at a new forced loan, the "Devotion Money" ostensibly to
cover a 40,000 ducat loan to the Emperor.

Despite expectations that

the Devotion Money would exceed the amount of the loan, a mere
£1,903 8s 3d was raised.114

lllJbid.
112p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance.

p. 150.

113H. Miller, Henry VIII and the English Nobility, (New York: Basil Blackwell,
1986) pp. 62-75; F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 150-151.
114p_ C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 150-153.
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The nation was neither willing nor able to pay more.

A

comparison of the coin supply and the intake of funds by the crown
shows the magnitude of the tax and loan burden on the nation.

The

collections of lay subsidies and tenths and 15ths in February 1541
and February 1542 netted £153,500.

If one accepts J. D. Gould's

calculation of the coin supply in 1542 as approximately £850,000
then

these

two

taxes

alone

brought

funds

equivalent

to

approximately 18 % of the outstanding coin in the realm into the
crowns possession.

Similarly the benevolent loan of 1542 brought in

£112,229 an amount equal to an additional 13% of the nations coin.
Much of the loan was however paid in plate, a sign of the shortage of
coin.115

Had the kingdom been at active war, then the money would

have been used to fund purchases.

Instead the money was being

accumulated to fund future war.116
The great revenue enhancement measures of the inter war
period had changed the nature of the crown's revenues only a little.
Annates were a step toward regular peacetime taxation but only of a
small portion of the population.

Peace time taxes had been raised

but only on the plea of impending war.

In addition the taxes and the

forced loans, which were tax equivalents, had been raised at such
high rates as to unsustainable and therefore clearly extraordinary.
No

new

means had been attempted to tap the wealth of the

115Jbid., pp 151-165.
116Letters and Papers, XVII, 194; The preamble to the forced loan of 1542
make it plain that the king both had treasure in reserve and had no intention of
spending it lest he "be disfurnished against any sudden event".
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merchants.

Instead

crown

revenues

had

become

increasingly

dependent on land rents and land sales.
THE SECOND WAR PERIOD 1542-1550
In the end the trading relationship between Flanders and
England and England and Spain led to a ten month truce in 1541
between England and the Empire.

The death of Catherine of Aragon in

1536 had removed one Hapsburg dynastic issue and the birth of
Edward in 1537 another.

Without a wronged aunt to defend and with

Princess Mary's status in the succession less critical Charles found
it easier to realign with England.
At

the

same

time

France's

alliance

with

Scotland

was

becoming increasingly irritating to Henry as Jam es V and Henry drew
apart over issues of religion.

Negotiations on the issue of subsidies

proved fruitless and Francis objected to Henry's improvement of
fortifications at Calais.

The French were being equally intransigent

on Italian issues.
War began over a minor incident in Scotland and quickly
escalated.117

The English victory at Solway Moss, November 1542,

was quickly followed by the death of James V.

The French began to

prepare an intervention to uphold the rights of the dowager queen,
Mary of Guise, and her infant daughter, Mary Stuart.

Faced with this

threat England joined the Empire in a league against the French and
117 R. B. Wernham, Before the Armada. The Emergence of the English Nation
1485-1588. (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
Letters and Papers, XVII, 925.

World, Inc,

1966), pp.

149-152;
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Turks.

This alliance, concluded February 11, 1543, was definitely

offensive in nature.

If Francis failed to make major concessions,

Charles and Henry would invade France to restore Ducal Burgundy to
the emperor and Normandy and Guienne to Henry.

Francis could not

yield and so the declaration of war followed on August 2, 1543.1 18
All attention then focused on the great invasion planned for
1544.

Some 40,000 troops were to be mustered for an advance on

Paris in concert with the Emperor.

Wriothesley and Paget took

charge of the finances for the war.

Wriothesley estimated that

£250,000 would be needed for the campaign.

Of that sum £ 84,000

were available from current revenue, £50,000 could be borrowed in
Flanders, and £116,000 could be raised by

various

expedients

without broaching the kings reserves.119
Commissions were issued to sell the king's lands, and his lead
stripped from the monastery roofs.
were sold.

Leases were made.

Bondsmen were manumitted.

Wardships

Grants of land, subject to

redemption, were made to citizens of London in return for loans.
Exemptions from personal military service were sold.

Proceeds

from these measures exceeded £191,000 before Michaelmas (29
September), 1544.

Steven Vaughn, a governor of the Merchant

Adventurers, was commissioned in March 1544 to start borrowing
money.

By the end of 1544 he had succeeded in borrowing 210,000

crowns, approximately £70,000.

118Ibid.;

Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, pp. 320-321.

119Letters and Papers, XIX, part I, 272.
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The final source of revenue for 1544 was debasement of the
coin.

Edmund Peckham was made High Treasurer of the Mint.

followed in April 1544 was not an orgy of debasement.
of the gold coin was reduced slightly.

What

The fineness

The fineness of the silver

coin was reduced 103 and the rate of seignorage was increased.

The

actual yield to anyone tendering specie to the mint, whether as
domestic coin, foreign coin, or plate was increased.
The war had however cost not £250,000 but £650,000.

This

overrun far exceeded the funds planned for the war and appears to
have exhausted the king's coffers.

By autumn the king was clearly

short of funds.

The king's officers were urged to husband the money

sent to them.120

Sir Richard Riche, treasurer of the armies in France

complained, "the poor soldiers do here die daily at Calais of the
plague and also of weakness for lack of victual." 121

Clearly

something had to be done to increase the coin available to pay for
the war.
The English position was made especially difficult by the
unhappy outcome of the campaign of 1544.

Instead of marching on

Paris, as was planned in 1543, Henry had sat down before Boulogne.
Boulogne fell on September 14, 1544.
the Empire made peace.

On September 18, France and

England was left to fight France alone.122

120Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 510.
121Quoted in Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 155.
122wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 157-158.
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Without reserves Wriothesley and Paget had to raise funds to
provide the full cost of continuing the war in 1545.
did not appear desperate.

In November

1544.

The situation

No offensive actions were contemplated.

Paget estimated the total cost of wages,

victuals, and fortifications for the period December 1544-May 1545
at £90,000.

In addition £10,000 would be required for munitions,

£4,000 would be required for Ireland and £40,000 would be required
to retire the Flanders debt.

Thus the total required through May

would be £144,000. Of this total the subsidy to be collected in
February would yield £100,000 leaving, by
£64,000 to be raised.
forced

loan,

Paget's

calculation,

Paget argued that a benevolence, that is a

be practiced to

make up

Parliamentary taxation would take too long.

the

short

fall

for,

as

Parliament could not

end before February 1545, the people could not know what had to be
paid before the end of March.

Collections could not begin for five

months from the end of March.

Therefore the meeting of Parliament

should be delayed to September.123
The benevolence would produce £50,000-£60,000 by the start
of the campaigning season and leave an additional £50,000 to supply
the needs of the summer without grieving the common people.

The

revenue required for June to November would be met by £40,000 to
be levied in anticipation of the Parliamentary grants to be made m
the fall and £50,000 in sale of lands.124

123Letters and Papers, XIX, II,

124Jbid.

689.

77
Unfortunately for this

moderate program, the French made a

very great effort in the Summer of 1545 both at sea and on land.
addition

the

Scotts

scored

a

signal

success

at

In

Ancrum Moor in

February 1545 and in May 3,500 French troops, well supplied with
money, arrived in Scotland.125
had

60,000

troops

commission.

The

under
renewal

Through the summer of 1545 England
arms

and

eighty

of offensive

under Hertford, in September

ships

action

of

against

war

in

Scotland,

1545 was a harbinger of things to

come.
Altogether the wars cost £560,000 between October 1544 and
September 1545.126
for that period.

Paget's estimate of needs had totaled £284,000

The cost overrun of £356,000 pounds had to be met

out of other sources.
Antwerp.127
mint's

Stephen Vaughn borrowed £128,929 Fl in

Peckam increased the minting of debased coin.

profits

were

something

on

the

order

of

The

£80,000.128

125Wernham, Before the Armada, pp 161-163.
126Letters and Papers, XX, part II, 324 This information is contained in a
letter from Wriothesley to Petre transmitting the declarations of the treasurers to be
shown to the king. It contains two tantalizing references to the matter of debt. First
"The Bonvix, etc. have written according to their promise.", that is the Bonvisi
bankers, and "This day I sent the post to Mr. Vaughn touching Haller's matter." This
Christopher Haller was a nephew of Wolff Haller von Hallerstein (d 1559), former
agent of the Fugger in Antwerp (before 1531), sometime treasurer to Mary of
Hungary (1531-?), and in the 1550s keeper of her privy purse. Ehrenberg, Capital
and Finance pp. 176-177, 201, 226-227.
127 That is about £108,000 at the October 1545 exchange.
128C.E. Challis, "The Debasement of the Coinage, 1542-1551 ", Ec.H.R., 2nd
ser., XX, No. 3 (1967), pp. 462-463 Comparisons of war expenses and mint income
are complicated by the fact that the mint reported on an April 1-March 31 year while
the treasurers reported on a Michaelmas basis. Only Tower I operated throughout this
period. Its profits probably exceeded £70,000. The Southwark mint which opened in
July 1545 may have contributed another £10,000.
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Borrowing from the mint, that is delaying the delivery of coin to
those who have rendered specie or coin for minting, rose to 100,000
marks.12 9

Sales of land continued at a great rate.

Parliament in

November 1545 voted yet another step in the destruction of the
medieval church by authorizing the expropriation of the chantries.
The

state

of

the

crowns

finances

was

summed

up

by

Wriothesley in response to a letter from the Council, 14 September
1545.
This morning, between 4 and 5 o'clock, I received your
letters of yesternight, signifying the levying of 4,300
new men, and desiring preparation of money for their
coats, conduct, &c., and my coming to court at my time
appointed, or before. If my horse were here I would be
with you this night;
but I will set forth Wednesday
morning. As to the money, I trust you consider what is
done already. This year and the last the King has spent
1,300,000£., his subsidy and benevolence ministering
scant 300,000£.; and, the lands being consumed and the
plate of the realm being molten and coined, I lament the
danger of the time to come. There is to be repaid in
Flanders as much and more than all the rest.
The
scarcity of com is such that, except in Norfolk, wheat is
20s the qr., and little of it to be had. Though the King
might have a greater grant than the realm could bear, it
would do little to the continuance of these charges this
winter, most of the subsidy being paid, the revenues
received beforehand, and more borrowed at the mint than

129Dietz, English Government Finance. p.156 A mark is usually 8 oz. Troy of
silver. Therefore at the mint price of £2 l 6s Od prevailing in April 1545 this would
have represented a loan of £186,667 from providers of silver to the mint to the
government.
On delays at the mint see Letters and Papers, XX part II, 729,
Wriothesley to Paget, 5 Nov. 1545. Wriothesley says the delays are three to four
months and longer.
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will be repaid these four or five months; and yet "you
write to me still pay, pay, prepare for this and that." 130
The campaign season of 1546 was blessedly inactive.
7 peace was concluded with France.

On June

Francis promised to pay the

pens10ns owing to Henry VIII during his lifetime and those in
perpetuity owing to his successors and to pay 2,000,000 crowns for
the fortresses built at Boulogne and for arrears in pensions by
Michaelmas 1554.

Upon receipt of the 2,000,000 crowns Boulogne

would be restored to him.

Scotland remained at war with England

but no major activity was undertaken.
1546 was a year of retrenchment and recovery.
crown lands halved from in
£75,000.131

excess

The sale of

of £160,000 to

less

than

The foreign debt was actually reduced by the not

insubstantial figure of £94,000.

This was possible in part due to

the effects of the collections of the subsidy and the first 10th and
15th granted by Parliament in 1545.
1546.

These yielded £135,000 in

The main factor was however the mint.

subsidiary mint had been opened at Canterbury.

In June 1545 a
It was followed in

July by a mint in Southwark and a second mint in the Tower.
mints at Bristol and York were added.

In 1546

The output of these mints and

their profit to the crown rose swiftly as debasement accelerated132.
The death of Henry VIII, 28 January 1547, brought the nine year
old Edward VI to the throne.

The first three years of his reign were

130Letters and Papers, Vol. XX, part 2, 366.

131f. C. Dietz, English Government
132See Tables I, II, and III, above.

Financ~

p.149.
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dominated by Edward Seymour, uncle to the king, First Earl Hertford,
who, as Duke of Somerset and Lord Protector, continued the war
with Scotland and thereby renewed the war with France.
cost

a

total

of

£1,386,687 .133

These

charges

These wars

along

with

a

significant increase in the expenses of the householdl3 4, the effects
of fraud at the mints and in the revenue courts135, and a self servmg
policy of land grants by the Privy Council to itself in the name of the
Kingl36

continued

to

impose

enormous

fiscal

stress

on

the

government.
The inherent weakness of Somerset's government was largely
to blame for the difficulties of 1547-1550.

Henry's will did not

leave him in a position to legitimately exercise what was in effect a
regency.

He therefore had to dispense patronage on a large scale.

That meant allowing the Privy Councilors to enrich themselves, a
weakening of audit controls, and an unwillingness to use politically
unpopular revenue measures.

133Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 182,

cites State Papers Domestic,

Edward VI, XV, 11.
134 F.C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p 190, Household expenses
increased from £38,804 in 1547-48 to £56,806 in 1550-51 and then declined to
£51,903 in 1552-53.
135p. C. Dietz, "Finance of Edward and Mary". pp. 78-80, Dietz gives an
admirable short account of the frauds and the accounting methods that made them
feasible.
1361bid., p.77, Lands to the annual value of £27,000, that is with a capital
value of £540,000 were granted in the seven years of Edward Vi's reign with rents of
£3,619 reserved to the crown.

81
The

continuing

enhancements.

wars

however

required

major

revenue

These were supplied primarily by the mint, by the

sale of lands through the Court of Augmentations, and by additional
foreign loans.
of 1548.

Somerset did attempt a Parliamentary tax, the Relief

This tax was levied on a revolutionary basis.

Instead of

being based on land it was assessed on sheep and wool based upon an
estimate of sheep in the realm based upon the wool customs of
Edward Ill.

It was

intended to yield between £106,000

and

Instead it yielded less than £54,000 in 1549 and only

£156,000.

£47 ,500 in 1550.137

The fall of Somerset in 1549 consequent to Kett's rebellion
ended the war period.

Peace was made with France and Boulogne

returned for 400,000 crowns, approximately £133,333.138
the wars had cost £3,500,000139

All told

The net yield of taxes and forced

loans not repaid between 1544-1551 was only £976,000.

The sale

of crown lands realized £1,048,255 between 1544 and 1554.

The

debasement

and

1551.140

of the

coin

earned

£1,270,000

between

1544

The debt in Flanders had grown from nothing in 1544 to

£132,000141

War had consumed the state.

137Jhid. p. 84-85. The basis for the assessment is explained in footnote 87 at
the bottom of page 84.
138Jbid., p. 89.
139p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. pp. 147, 182.
140c. E. Challis, "Debasement", p 454.
14lp_ C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 191 n 9.
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NOR1HUMBER1AND AND MARY
Northumberland's government attempted to confront the fiscal
crisis.

The Privy Council launched a series of investigations of the

royal revenues to establish a basis for reform.

The most important

of these was the Revenue Commission of 1552 which studied in
detail the regular sources

and uses

of the

kings

funds.

Its

conclusions highlighted the seriousness of the revenue shortfall.
After fixed charges grants and annuities, the crown had available

£168, 150 per annum.

From this sum had to be deducted normal

government payments for officials and ministers, the household and
wardrobe, the charges for the audit courts, and the charges for
permanent garrisons totaling £131,600.

This left a clear account of

£36,550 with which to meet the charges of the admiralty, the
ordinance, the privy purse, the New Years gifts, the charges of the
household in excess of its assignments, and the charges of Calais
and Ireland.

The peacetime expenses exceeded the normal

by a sum in excess of £60,000 per annum.142

revenu~s

But this was not all.

The realm was nearly defenseless for lack of money.

It was

immediately necessary to service and if possible retire £250,000 in
debts of which £132,000 were owed in Flanders.143
Until

substantial

reforms

could

be

undertaken

there

was

simply no way to meet the ordinary charges of government, short of

157;

142w. C. Richardson, ed., The Report of the Revenue Commission of 1552,
Dietz, English Government Finance.. 190-191.

p.

143w. K. Jordan, Edward VI. The Threshold of Power, (London: George Allen
Unwin,1970), p. 457.

&
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taxation,

without

a

continuation

of

debasement,

the

sale

of

additional lands, or a renewed attack on the church's remaining
assets.

Taxation was, if not out of the question, politically risky.

It

would have required summoning Parliament to ask for a peacetime
tax.
Dietz
"In

the

stigmatized Northumberland's

expedients

which

deficiency, resort was
sterility

of

situation."144
The

ideas

were

had to

and

a

all

failure

used

government
to

remedy

the old
to

grasp

this

devices,
the

as

follows.
alarming

betraying

cause

of

a
the

This was unfair.

duke's

government

did

collection, and stricter accounting.

focus

on

retrenchment,

Costs were reduced.

debt

Soldiers

and workmen were discharged and the expenses of the household
reduced.

Both the Flanders debt and the domestic debt were reduced.

Northumberland inherited an Antwerp debt of £132,000 while Mary
inherited only £61,000.145

It is true that Northumberland resorted

to a final major round of debasement in April 1551 which made
£114,500 for the crown, but it also true that in October 1551 he
restored the fineness of the new silver coin to approximately that of
1526.146
144F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p.191. I suspect that this was
largely an attack on Pollard as the language is essentially the same as he used to
describe Mary's government.
145D. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1979) p.183; J. Guy, Tudor England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) p.
217 says, "Borrowing was initially extended but-partly thanks to manipulations of the
foreign exchanges by Thomas Gresham £132,372 in Flanders and £108,800 in England
were repaid by 1553." I cannot determine the source of this inconsistancy.
146J. D. Gould, Debasement p. 12.
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What
determined
efforts

Dietz

really

undervalued

effort to reorganize the

toward

reducing

the

was

fiscal

complexity

Northumberland's

administration.
of

His

administration

and

concentrating oversight and policy formulation in the Privy Council.
This led, in March 1553, to an Act for the Dissolving, Uniting, or
Annexing of certain Courts, which would have amalgamated First
Fruits and Tenths, and Augmentations with the Exchequer, thereby
bringing the bulk of receipts and the bulk of payments into a single
court.147
Whether the combination of cost reduction and administrative
reform pushed forward by Northumberland would have worked cannot
be known.

The reality of royal insolvency in the summer of 1552

required the sale of crown lands for £144,259 in the last six months
of the reign.148

This in itself was insufficient.

William Cecil

proposed a new export levy on cloth to raise £40,000, an idea that
died at the time but shows that the sort of thinking that led to
Mary's new Book of Rates was already current in Northumberland's
CounciI.149

Not

Parliament had to be summoned in March 1553.

without opposition, a peace time grant of a subsidy

and two

fifteenths and tenths was made.ISO

147J. Guy, Tudor England p. 216-219.
148w. K. Jordan, Edward VI. Threshold of Power, (London: George Allen
Unwin, 1970),

p. 463.

149Jbid. p. 457.
150W. K. Jordan, Edward VI: The Threshold of Power, pp. 508-509.

&
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The accession of Mary, did little to change the direction of
government policy.

William Cecil was removed from the council but,

after a period of hesitancy,

Winchester was

retained as

Lord

Treasurer, Peckham was retained at the mint, Sir John Baker was
retained as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Walter Mildmay was
retained at Augmentations, and Sir Thomas Gresham was retained in
Flanders.151
This continuity of key individuals in office led to a very high
level of continuity between Northumberland's administration and
Mary's.

The amalgamation of Augmentations and First Fruits into the

Exchequer was reauthorized and carried through.
mcrease in

the household expenses

After a two year

(1553-1555)

expenses were

reduced from a peak of £62,640 in 1553-1554 to a minimum of
£36,208

in

1557-1558.

stabilized at something

The

expenses

of the

over £6,000 per annum.

wardrobe

were

Payments of

pensions and annuities were brought down to £5978 from Easter
1557 to Easter 1558 compared to a cost of £20,000 per annum under
Edward.152
On the revenue side the Marian administration was more than a
mere continuation of its predecessor.

Net land alienations ceased.

The attainders against Northumberland were offset by grants to the
Howards, Percies, and others who had suffered under Henry VIII and
Edward VI.

The management of the remaining estates was improved.

Rents and entry fines were increased to compensate for inflation.
1510. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 190-191.
152c. F. Dietz, English Government Finance.

pp 202-205.

86

This was a long process because of the normal lease term of
approximately 20 years but a start was made.

The clear yield of

lands in Augmentations rose from £26,883 in 1552-1553 to £47,723
m 1556-1557.153

This increase continued into Elizabeth's reign.

Finally and most importantly the customs were reformed.

The

valuations for customs purposes had not changed from those of
As a result of the inflation the value of customs revenues had

1507.

declined.

Moreover nominal revenue had declined due to changes in

the mix of exports away from wool to clothes and from traditional
cloth to new draperies.

Mary had the right to increase import duties

but in former times export duties had been negotiated with the
merchants.

The decision to increase the export duties by more than

100% led to the referring of the matter to the courts which ruled

that as the sovereign had the right to forbid exports she also had the
right to tax them "de son absolute power."
book of rates came into effect.
customs

revenues

from

On May 28, 1558 the new

At a single blow it increased

approximately £30,000

to

in

excess

of

£80,000.154

In the matter of the Flanders debt Mary's policy followed a
different course than Northumberland's.
greatest need was for cash.

Upon her accession Mary's

Inheriting a debt of £61,000 she

expanded it by October 1554 to over £150,000,155

By January 1556

153Ibid. pp. 205-206.
154Ibid. pp. 208-209; D. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 415-418.
1550. M. Loades, The Reign of Mazy Tudor, p. 201.
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that had been reduced to £109,013.

When Thomas Gresham closed

his accounts in August 1557 the debt had been eliminated.

The

renewal of war in 1557 called the debt back into existence.

On

Mary's death she left Elizabeth an Antwerp debt of £90,000. 156

156Jbid., p. 420.

CHAPfERVI

THE FLANDERS DEBT

1544-1550
Henry VIII's Flanders loans played only a modest role in
financing the first phase of his third war with France.
important because they provided ready
operations.

Bedeviled,

as

always,

by

They were

money in the theatre of
the

delay

between

the

proclamation of forced loans, Parliamentary grants, and land sales
and the collection of coin, Henry needed to tap new sources of com.
The solution was, as it had been repeatedly for Charles V, to borrow
money in Antwerp.

To this end Stephen Vaughn, a governor of the

Merchant Adventurers157, and the King's Agent in Flanders, was
commissioned, in May 1544, to "take up" 100,000 ducats monthly in
Antwerp.158

That would have been in excess of £30,000 per month.

It appears that Wriothesley's estimates of cost were already proving

overly optimistic by May.

157The Merchant Adventurers had two governors, one in London, and one in
Antwerp. Vaughn was the Antwerp governor. , Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p.
251.

158The single ducat had been set by proclamation at 5s in July 1538 and were
therefore equivalent to a crown. Hughs and Larkin, Tudor Royal Proclamations, Vol I
p. 264. The fiat value of foreign gold pieces was not expressly effected by the
revaluation of 16 May 1544, Ibid., p. 327.
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The Regent, Mary of Hungary, also bedeviled by the slow
collection of taxes, was alarmed by Henry's wish to borrow in
Flanders.

She wrote Chapuy's, the imperial ambassador in England:

"If the King were then to raise money here it would much
impede the Emperor's affairs, who cannot bring money
out of Spain without risk, whereas the king can safely
conduct money from England; here also a great part of the
aids have to be raised "par finance", as they are not paid
as promptly as needed." 159

She however told Chapuys to inform the king,
..... she desires nothing so much as that he might get all he
needs, provided the Emperor's affairs are not impeded
thereby, but that, for the aforesaid reasons, the levying
of money here would much hinder them, and she would
pray him to levy it in his own realm.160
The regent was not overstating the case.

She was in the

process of raising enormous loans in Flanders, mostly on the credit
of the Receivers General but also on the credit of the cities
including Antwerp, in Charles V's behalf.
principal

agent

was

Gaspard

Ducci,

a

In this process her
Florentine banker,

arbitrager of somewhat unsavory reputation.

and

He had raised £1.2

million Flemish for Charles on the credit of the City of Antwerp in

1543, and was to raise an additional £3.5 million Flemish for the
Hapsburgs in 1544.

He also invented a new export tax and became

its first farmer.161

With such large financial measures in hand the

159Letters and Papers, XIX, part I, 578.
160Jbid.
161For Gaspard Ducci's activities see Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, pp.
146-271.
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Regent's displeasure at the English entering the market was not
surpnsrng.
Professor Dietz
market,

"No

operations.

real

said,

refering

opposition,

to

Vaughn's

however,

was

entry

made

to

into

the

Vaughn's

He fell in with a broker or intermediary, Jasper Douche,

through whom he was brought in touch with merchants and bankers
who had money to lend." 162
two accounts.

This explanation is unsatisfactory on

First, as the Governor of the Merchant Adventurers, it

is inconceivable that Stephen Vaughn was so ill informed of matters
on the Bourse that he needed Jasper Douche to tell him who had
money to lend.

Second, this Jasper Douche was Gaspard Ducci.

Apparently Henry had received permission to borrow, but only
under the strict supervision of the Regent's chief financial agent.
Vaughn employed the services of Jasper Douche as a broker, but
Douche's real master remained the Hapsburgs.

Vaughn made at least

one attempt to borrow around Jasper Douche but to no avail.
simply refered back to Jasper Douche.

He was

Antwerp was the Hapsburg's

credit market and Jasper Douche was their agent.

No substantial

loans could be taken up without his consent.
Douche arranged loans of 122,778 crowns from the Welser163
for nine months at a rate of 10 1/23 or 143 per annum.

This first

162F. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 167.
163 For information on the Welsers of Augsburg see R. Ehrenberg, Capital &
Finance in the Age of the Renaissance, a Study of the Fuggers and Their Connections,
translated by H.M. Lucas, (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1963) especially p. l39ff;
The Welsers had already loaned 800,000 crowns to the Emperor but, according to
Vaughn,17 June 1544, were "not yet empty". Letters and Papers, XX, part I, 725.
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loan was followed by other smaller loans.

By the end of 1544

Vaughn and Douche had raised a total of only 210,000 crowns net,
that is with the interest deducted in advance164

Maturities on

Vaughn's borrowing extended from December 1544 to February 1545.
Attempts to raise more loans failed.

Douche advised Vaughn, who

advised the Council, December 19, 1544, that the best means to
raise additional money was to borrow goods, "as pepper and fustians,
which may be uttered again for ready money" on the credit of major
London

merchants,

Warren" .165

especially

"both

the

Greshams

and

Ralph

While this particular expedient was not used at this

time it will recur later.
The English loans were secured in the same cumbersome
fashion as were imperial loans.

First a merchant, or banking house

had to guarantee the king's bonds against default.

The credit of

neither the Staplers nor the Adventurers was acceptablel66 and so
the Vivaldi and Bonvisi houses were pressed into service167.

The

bankers in turn were guaranteed by individual Privy Councilors
including, Wriothesley,

the

Duke of Suffolk

(who

associated with the Bonvisi), and Sir Anthony Brown.

was

closely

In addition Sir

Richard Gresham and Sir John Gresham guaranteed the Italians.168
164Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 822.
165Letters and Papers, XX, part II, 764.
166Jbid., part II, 630.
167These were long established in England and the Bonvisi continued to play a
significant role into the 1570s. Ehrenberg, pp. 226-227.
168Dietz, English Government
630, 725, 759.

Financ~ p.

167; Letters and Papers, XIX part I,

92
As always with sixteenth century floating loans the coin had
scarcely

been

pressing.

taken

up

when

the

issue

of repayment became

In June Vaughn approached the Weiser with the proposal

that they buy lead from the king to fund the repayment of their loan.
In July Vaughn urged the Council to send a stock of lead to Antwerp
to improve the government's credit.

However, the price of lead fell

and Vaughn urged, at the end of August, that it would prove cheaper,
in light of the high transportation costs, to renew the December
loans until February than to sell lead at a loss on a depressed
market.169

This was accomplished through the agency of Jasper

Douche, who appears to have received, in return, permission to
transport certain jewels into England,

free

of customs,

to

sell

either on his own account or for the account of the Fuggers.170
As the new day of payment approached, means of payment
without exporting coin were again sought.

Paget had the idea of

using the proceeds of the Merchant Adventurer's sales at the Cold
Mart of 1545 to repay the loans.

This idea was to recur over the

next twelve years and was to become an important element in debt
service.

It would not serve in 1545 as the debt was due on February

169For the negotiations concerning the lead see, Letters and Papers, XIX, part
II, 119, 143, 743; XX, part I, 1261, 1265; part II, App. 41. The negotiations on the
lead were to drag on until July 1545 when Vaughn succeeded in arranging with a group
of Spanish merchants the exchange of lead at £4 13s 4d the fodder (2184 lbs) for
30,000 quintals (3,000,000 pounds) of alum at 13s 4d the quintal, customs duties to
be paid by the Spaniards. This is an example of the lack of separation of official trade
and state finance which typify Henry's and Edward's dealings at Antwerp. This deal
turned out to be unsatisfactory due to the large amount of alum depressing the English
market.
170Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 755.
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10 while the Adventurers could not receive payment for another six
weeks.

Vaughn did attempt, unsuccessfully to discover the amount

owed to the merchants due on February 10 but was unable to do so
secretly.1 71

In any

case, the merchants, "fearing the last peace

between the Emperor and the French king, took wares beforehand for
the greater part of their debts owing this Cold Mart." 172

That is, the

merchants, fearing a disruption of trade due to diplomatic changes,
sold their bills on the bourse and purchased goods.

This effectively

forestalled any attempt to use their funds to service the debt.
On February 10, 1545 the loans were repaid in full out of
Henry's domestic revenue.

The fiscal situation was such that funds

had to be assembled from a multiplicity of sources.

Funds were

scraped together from the Exchequer, Augmentations, the Treasury
of

the

Chamber,

First

Fruits

and

Tenths,

and

the

mint.173

Presumably the payments were 2/3 gold and 1/3 silver, the standard
imperial repayment terms.174

This, according to Dietz, established

the king's credit.175
The payment terms enjoyed by the English government were
slightly better than the terms Douche arranged for the imperial
government.

The emperor paid 12% interest plus 1% per fair.

171Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 751.
172Jbid, XIX, part II, 795.
173ibid, XX, part I, 154; XXI, part I, 716 (4), (5).
174Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 756.

175p_ C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 170.

As
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there were four fairs in the year this made 16% per annum.176
English paid only 14 %.

The

The English had to make the payment in the

same manner as the emperor, that is 2/3 gold and 1/3 silver.1 77
This first group of loans had been intended to be simple
revenue anticipation loans.

As Wriothesley intended to wage the

war without drawing on the king's reserves, coin was needed for the
war in advance of the receipts of Augmentations and the profits of
the mint.

The proceeds from the loans were spent directly on the

invasion of France.

They were used for the expenses and pay of the

army invading France, for the hire of wagons, and for the purchase of
munitions.178
Unfortunately

the

Wriothesley's projection.

war

had

cost

more

than

2

1/2

times

Between their inception and their due date

the loans had become a major burden.

Other means of repayment

were sought, but the situation was not yet so bad that money could
not be pulled together to liquidate the debt.
The second round of loans was different.

With the King's

credit, if we are to believe Professor Dietz, now established,179
176Letters and Papers, XIX, part II, 66.
177Van der Wee, Antwerp, vol I, p. 120; vol II.,

p. 203.

178,Letters and Papers. XIX, part I 822, 859, 887, 1099 and, ibid, part II,
108, 160, 220.
179p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance, p. 170 ; As we shall see, this
was a very optimistic assessment of the King's credit. Despite major efforts to
negotiate loans Stephen Vaughn managed to complete one significant loan in 1545.
Dietz based his opinion on Vaughn's report , Letters and Papers, XX, part I, 154 This
acceptance of a single report by Vaughn as an established fact is unfortunately typical
of Dietz.
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Douche moved to raising money from the Fuggers who were willing
to accept the guarantee of the Merchant Adventurers, the Staplers,
and the king.

The Fuggers lent Henry VIII a nominal 300,000 crowns

composed of 260,000 gold crowns at 10% with an additional 2 %
charge to dispense with repayment provisions specifying repayment
m Carolus gilderns and crowns180, and 40,000 crowns in jewels at
an unknown profit.181

This loan was actually concluded on the credit

of the City of London, and the Merchant Adventurers.
from repaying in gold crowns was important.

The exemption

There was a coin

shortage in the Netherlands due to the war and the consequent
interruption of coin and specie deliveries from Spain.182
The Flemish believed that the proceeds of the loan were bound
for the mint.183

If this was true then it could have been reminted at

a 6% profit at fiat value to Henry.184 This would have effectively
reduced the interest rate to something over 4 % depending on the
actual value of the jewels received, given that the exchange rate

180That is to say, the Fuggers were willing to accept the exchange risk in
accepting repayment in English or other coin rather than in "valued gold", coin with an
established fiat value in the Netherlands.
181f. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 170; Letters and Papers, XX,
part I, 13, 892, 996, 1316; part II, 36, 114, 333, 362, 595, 707.
182Letters and Papers, XX, part I, 578.
183p. C. Dietz, English Government Finance. p. 170; Letter and Papers. XX,
part II, 262 seems to support Dietz's contention but Wriothesley's language is
sufficiently guarded to leave some room for doubt. Vaughn in Letters and Papers, XX,
part II, 388, which relates to the actual arrest of coin in September 1545 ascribes
the Flemish fear of melting to his position at the mint.
184 Gould , Debasement p. 12.
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between Antwerp and London remained stable.

The Flemings opposed

the export of coin for melting but permission was finally obtained
and the coin was allowed to depart.185

How much of it reached the

mint is problematic.
Vaughn entered into extensive negotiations with Christopher
Haller for additional loans.186

The amounts sought varied over the

time of the negotiation but were initially 40,000 crowns, and in the
end

100,000 crowns.187

several reasons.

These negotiations proved abortive for

In the first place not all of the money would be

available in Antwerp.

Half of it would have to be received in

Frankfort, a great inconvenience when the money was truly wanted
at Calais.188

Second, the Haller required not only the guarantee of

the City of London and the king but also those of no less than four
Italian banking houses established in London.
were

forwarded

When these guarantees

Christopher Haller changed to

guarantors be in Antwerp.

asking

that

the

This portion of the negotiation was

hampered by the refusal of the Antwerp Bonvisi to support the
London Bonvisi, having suffered some form of falling out.

Third, the

English wished to have delivery changed to Calais to avoid the arrest
of their funds by the Hapsburgs.

Fourth, by October, the Haller were

185Letters and Papers, XX, part II 407, 507, 550.
186Letters and Papers, XX, part I, 1214,1223, 1316 (1, 2), 1317,1333; part
II, 9, 36, 74, 92, 111, 113-4, 153, 192, 217, 243, 258, 284, 302, 324, 333-4,
340, 355, 362-4, 340, 355, 362-4, 374, 388, 443-4, 507, 551, 565, 597, 6545, 694.

187Jbid, part II, 9, 694.
188Jbid, part II, 36.
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no longer willing to loan the full amount in coin but wished the
English to take 25,000-30,000 crowns in jewels.189
These negotiations are revealing

for at least two reasons.

First, the coin shortage in Antwerp must have been becoming acute
by August 1545.

The Haller' s wish that coin be taken up in Frankfort

pointed in this direction as did the switch to jewels in October.
Second, the diplomatic situation was clearly deteriorating.

Henry

VIII's breach of his agreement with Charles V to make Paris the goal
of the campaign of 1544 had guaranteed an indecisive campaign
which the Emperor, who wished to disable France so that he could
turn against the League of Schmalkalden, could not afford.

When a

separate peace was concluded between France and the Empire on
September 19, 1544, the decline in amity led to the fear that the
king's money would be "arrested" _190
This was delayed until the death of the Duke of Orleans
removed the French threat in September 11, 1545.191

At that point

the Fugger loan was still not entirely in hand and the chances of
completing the Haller loan declined dramatically.
were actually arrested on September 20.

The king's funds

Negotiations succeeded in

gaining the release of the funds but all coin had to be converted out
of Imperial coin into a wide variety of other coin before export.
This process was costly and time consuming.192
189Jbid, part II, 694.
190Jbid., part II, 388, 407, 507, 550.
191Jbid., part II, 350, 351.
192Jbid., part II, 407.
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Vaughn's accountl93 for 1545 shows five borrowings.
three are bill

transactions

originated in

Chancellor for payment in Antwerp.

England by

Of these
the

Lord

The first of these was for

£5 ,500 Flemish for conduct money for German mercenaries secured
from, rather than on the credit of, the Bonvici bank.

The second was

for £18,000 Fl. which netted to £16,896 12s Fl. after origination,
delivery and interest charges.

The third, also for unknown purposes

was a small loan of £533 6s 8d Fl. made by Sir John Gresham.
The other two loans were actually "taken up" in Antwerp.
1s they were borrowed on the bourse.

That

They consisted of the Fugger

loan of £100,000 Fl. and a loan of £6,000, actually taken up by
Jasper Douche, for repayment in London.

This loan was probably

related to Douche's much troubled trade in wode and herring.

This

was a rather poor showing for a king whose credit "was established."
During the year Vaughn remitted £31,827 to Thomas Gresham,
who may then have been acting as a treasurer for War at Calais,
directly paid £77 ,066 for military expenses, primarily the wages of
German mercenaries, and sent £40,000 in jewels to England.

In

addition he paid £5,000 to Jasper Douche for his herring seized m
England, and £800 in brokerage fees.
for transporting coin.

Miscellaneous fees were paid

How much of the money paid to Gresham was

spent in France and how much was remitted to England is uncertain
but it is clear that most of the money was spent in France rather
than forwarded to the mint.

193Ibid, part II, 957.
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Vaughn ended the year with the Fugger loan due in August and
the need for additional funds to carry on the wars unabated.

The

change in the diplomatic situation did not immediately reduce the
Imperial demand for credit as Charles continued borrowing heavily
for his war against the German Protestant princes.
England was now facing France alone.

In addition

While it was clearly in the

Emperor's interest that England not be completely defeated by
France, it was equally clearly in the Emperor's interest that England
not be free

to assist the Protestant princes.

In addition the

immanence of war in Germany disrupted trade, thereby reducing the
value of the bonds of the Merchant Adventurers and the City of
London.

One positive effect of the change in the diplomatic situation

was that Jasper Douche disappeared from English finance.194
Despite this situation Vaughn was under enormous pressure to
raise additional loans.

He succeeded in borrowing £30,000 Flemish

in fustians from the Fuggers in February for six months.
was guaranteed by the city of London.

Repayment

The "loan" carried the

provision that the fustians had to be sold in England for not less
than the loan amount.

This was accomplished19S but the short period

194Douche continued to play an important role for the Hapsburgs down to 1550
when his arbitrage activities between Lyons and Antwerp got him involved in loaning
money to the king of France. The Procurator-General demanded the death penalty and
the right to examine Ducci under torture, but, although Ducci was convicted of usury
the treason charges were dropped. He fell from favor. Ehrenberg, Capital and
Financh pp. 159-160.
1951t is important to note that no coin was loaned in the Netherlands. The coin
was instead raised in England. It would be interesting to know who the buyers were.
I suspect that the sale of the Fustians was to London merchants and in part a forced
contribution.
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of the loan left both it and the prior Fugger loan of 300,000 crowns
(£100,000 Flemish) due on August 15, 1546.
To meet this need Vaughn attempted to negotiate other loans
through the spring and early summer of 1546.

He succeeded only in

ra1smg £27, 125 FL on the letters of credit of the Italian merchant
houses in London.

These were in fact English domestic loans on

which the proceeds were received in Antwerp rather than foreign
borrowing.

Faced with the immanence of default, the Council

decided to repay £152,189 Fl. and to prolong the rest.196
The repayment of even a portion of the crown's debts required
great efforts.

Again, as in 1545, sums were pulled together from

the various treasuries.

They totaled £94,000 sterling which should

have been about £120,000 Fl.

In addition £20,000 Fl. was borrowed

from Erasmus Schetz who paid it directly to the Fugger.

Finally, on

August 15, 1546, the due date, the Fugger agreed to accept payment
of £92,180 Fl and to put over the balance for six months at 6 112 %
in return for the English buying in excess of 8,571 quintals of copper
for £20,000 Fl., the whole to be secured by the bonds of the City of
London.197

Slowly through the fall the lesser debts were retired.

When Henry VIII died on January 7, 1547 he left no overdue
debts.

The outstanding indebtedness consisted of £80,000 Fl. owed

to the Fugger, and £20,000 Fl. owed to the Schetz.
modest enough debt after three years of war.

This was a

However, England was

not yet at peace and the resources of the kingdom were very
196Letters and Papers, XXI, part I, 1042.
197Jbid., part I, 1250, 1383 (98), 1537 (2).
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strained.

The year 1546 had seen a very marked change in the

quality of English credit.

The king, far from being able to borrow

com on his own credit and that of the Privy Council and the City of
London, had been reduced to borrowing goods at artificial rates and
to accepting jewels in place of coin at a significant but unknown
cost.

The necessity of purchasing copper in order to renew the

Fugger loan in August 1546 shows clearly that the English debt was
not investment grade.
Edward Vi's new government under the Protector Somerset in
1547 was faced with the same need for funds as Henry's had been.
Under

these

conditions

there

was

little

possibility

of

either

increasing the debt, England's credit was too bad, or reducing it,
England's finances were too weak.

This led to a policy of prolonging

repayment at the cost of repeated purchases of goods and jewels
whose value was less than the nominal amount loaned.
paid with other loans.

Loans were

This however is not the heart of the story for

as we shall see a major function of the Antwerp debt became to
supply silver to the mint.
In September Stephen Vaughn, who had been attempting to
return to England for some time, left Antwerp to take up an
appointment as an under-treasurer of the mint.
until his death in 1549.

He held this position

The replacement of the highly competent

Stephen Vaughn by William Dansell in January 1547 coincided with a
change in the relationship between the King's Agent and the king's
government.

Stephen Vaughn's correspondence with Paget and the

Council was, in general, that of a trusted and respected agent with
satisfied employers.

The

correspondence of Dansell

with

Sir

""'
lVL

1

William Paget, Sir Thomas Smith and the Council was a long series
of exasperated complaints originating from London and querulous
self justification originating from Antwerp.
Vaughn in 1546.

Dansell had assisted

Now with Vaughn's departure to England he took

over both as Governor of the Merchant Adventurers in Antwerp and as
King's Agent.

Thomas Gresham, who had been serving as a treasurer

at Calais assisted Dansell in raising and transporting coin.
Dansell's situation was demanding.
major areas.

He was operating in four

He was borrowing and repaying floating or bourse loans

for the crown.

He was buying silver bullion for the mint.

He was

acting as a government purchasing agent especially for military
equipment.

He was acting as a government sales agent for lead, tin,

and bell metal.

In these efforts his position was weakened by the

proclivity of the Lord Protector and the Council for going around him
directly to lenders, sellers and buyers.

It is hard to resist a feeling

of sympathy for the much harassed Dansell.
Dansell's correspondence with the Council begins with a letter
to Paget, dated March 24, 1547 in which he announced the payment
of the debt owed to Erasmus Schetz and A. Fugger and the
transmittal of the cancelled bonds to the Privy Council.
correspondence preserved came from 1549.

The next

In that two year period

two loans were recorded in the Treasury of Receipt.

The first was a

loan from Anthony Fugger on 13, October, 1547 for 129,650 florins
to be repaid on March 31, 1548.

The second was a loan from Lazarus
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Tucher in April 1548 for 167 ,218 florins.198

This loan is probably

the loan due on May 15, 1549.
It would be surprising if these two loans represented the sum

total of borrowing by the crown in Antwerp in those years but they
may very well be the bulk of that borrowing.

We have already seen

that in the Vaughn period there was usually only one major loan
outstanding at a time.

The easy assumption that the loan was from a

single banking house should be avoided.

They may very well

represent consortium loans with the nominal originator acting for a
group of bankers.

In any case the loan of 1547 would have

essentially replaced the Fugger and Schetz loans paid in April.

The

loan of 1548 would then have replaced the 1547 loan.
The extant correspondence resumed with a letter from Dansell
to the Lord Protector, 20 April, 1549, which announced that he had
acquired money sufficient to pay the debt due on May 20 at 13 % and
that if his majesty required more he could borrow another £100,000
at 14 3 without taking any goods.
borrowed at 15, 16, and even 183.

He added that the Emperor himself
The Council's response, 25 April

1549, noted that Lazarus Tuch er expected to be repaid in full on May
15th or be informed in advance of the king's wish to renew the loan.
The Council advised Dan sell to take up no more money at 13 % and to
negotiate the renewal of the loan at 12 %,199

Dans ell's response of 3

May, outlined his negotiations with Tucher for renewal, which were
not going well, and with Erasmus Schetz for the money to pay Tucher
198p. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward and Mary", pp. 86-87.
199Turnbull, Calendar, Mary, 137, 139.
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which were proceeding.

These negotiations yielded a loan from

Schetz to pay off the Tucher loan at an interest rate of 13 %.

While

that loan was being collected Tucher offered to loan the king
100,000

Carolus

guilders

(50,000

ducats,

or £ 16,667)

at

13 %

interest.200
In what may be a separate matter, the Council, on 17 May,
1549 expressed surprise that they had received no reply to their
letter respecting a bargain for bullion with Lazarus Tucher.

This

letter crossed with a letter of Dansell's of May 17 which noted the
completion of the purchase of bullion.

Lazarus Tucher had absolutely

refused to export bullion from the Emperor's dominions but Dansell
and a friend had purchased his entire supply of silver and would sell
it to the crown at 6s. the fine ounce.201
We have obviously entered a discussion in full flow.

Dans ell

had in hand efforts to refinance the debt at 13 %, 1 3 lower than the
rates of 1546, and without the purchase of any goods.
Council disapproved the rate is unclear.
commercial

interest

rates

reached

Why the

Van der Wee says that

10 %

in

the

l 540s202

but

government interest rates had been consistently at least 2 % and
often 4 % higher than commercial rates.
was borrowing at 15-18 %.
Netherland's

Dan sell says the Emperor

The truth of this is hard to sort out.

court occasionally paid

200Jbid., 139, 142, 146.
201Jbid., 147, 148.
202van der Wee, Antwerp, vol. II, p. 362.

as

little as

9%

on

The
small
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loans203 in the late 1540s but Ducci was borrowing large sums for
them at 12 112 -13%204

A thorough, loan by loan survey of payment

terms and nominal interest rates would be needed to determine what
rates

the

Imperial

government

was

really

paying

on

loans

In any case Dansell was not

comparable to the English loans.
achieving the best rate in the market.

The matter of the silver bullion is equally interesting.

As

noted above the key source of income for Somerset's regime was the
mint.

In order for that source to be productive a steady supply of

specie was necessary.
three sources.

That specie could be and was derived from

The most obvious source was the minting of plate and

jewels, especially church plate.
the reminting of com.

The second domestic source was

The third source was the importation of

specie, either as coin or as bullion.
The bullion transaction of May 1549 is the first recorded but
is unlikely to have been the first.

In it Dansell was associated with

Thomas Gresham, former treasurer at Calais and future King's Agent
at Antwerp.

They purchased bullion from Lazarus Tucher, clearly on

government instruction205, but at least in form on their own account
and then smuggled the bullion out of the Netherlands.

They offered

it for sale to the mint at 6s the troy ounce or £3 12s the pound, a

203Jbid.
204Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, 264ff., S.T. Bindoff, "Economic Change",
New Cambridge Modern History, ed. G.R. Elton, vol II, p.64, suggests 123 as the
market rate.
205see especially , Turnbull, Calendar. Mary, 156.
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good price as the mint price of silver varied between £3 8s and £3
12s.

At the £3 12s price the mint would coin £7 4s and make a

profit for the government of £3 12s the pound.206
This left only the problem of paying for the silver.

On the

surface it makes little sense to buy silver to mint, especially if one
was paying 13 % per annum for the privilege.

The answer to the

profitability of the bullion import and minting business lay in the
exchange rate.

Between May 1542 and April 1549 the intrinsic

silver content of English coins had fallen by 60% while the exchange
rate had fallen only 20%.207

This resulted in a situation in which the

fiat value of coin produced from a pound of silver had increased by
150% while the exchange value of that coin in Antwerp had increased
by 100%.
The implications

of this

situation were

staggering.

The

government could, by importing and minting silver, earn a major
profit at fiat value and

at exchange value.

If a merchant in Antwerp

were willing to export silver specie, whether coin or bullion, in
contravention of the imperial ban on export, and sell it to the mint
m England, he too would make a substantial profit.
The situation was not the same for gold and therein lies a part
of the solution to the apparent illogic of the situation.

One needs to

remember the standard imperial payment terms with which Stephen
Vaughn had had to comply.
silver.

The emperor paid in 2/3 gold and 1/3

The debasement of the gold coin had been much less than the
206Gould, The Great Debasement p. 12.

207Ibid.,

p 94.
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debasement of silver coin.

The imperial payment terms by placing

gold in the dominant position reduced the impact of the debasement
of silver.

Between May 1542 and April 1549 the gold content of

English coin had declined only 203 against fiat value.

This was

approximately equivalent to the decline in the exchange rate.208
That is English coin was trading at about the melt value, or Flemish
mint price, of the gold component.

The silver component, because of

its convertibility at fiat value, was trading far above its melt value.
The profits from importing silver were equal to the full se1gnorage
available on silver minted plus 1/3 of the exchange profit as long as
the English were willing to export gold to make up balance of
payments residuals.

A glance at Table III will show that at

precisely this period the mint was making a major effort to attract
gold for reminting.

The seignorage on gold was reduced from £5 8s

in April 1546 to only £1 4s in April 1547 while the fineness of the
gold coin was maintained.

This foregone profit was worth it if it

permitted the government to obtain gold to export in return for
silver.

If this analysis is correct, it is as elegant an example of

bimetallic currency value manipulation as one is ever likely to see.
Dansell was also attempting to sell tin, lead, and bell metal.
In this he seems to have been somewhat confused and the Council's

exasperation is easy to understand.

On 29, May 1549 he notified Sir

Thomas Smith that Lazarus Tucher had received letters from Bruno,
his factor in Antwerp, that the Lord Protector and the Council would

208This is a rather simple explanation.
Gould, The Great Debasement pp.86-113.

For a more sophisticated view see
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"bargain with him for money to be had in Frankfort, and to repay the
same in tin, lead, and bell metal here."

He informs Smith that

Tuch er is willing to loan the king £22,500 at 12 %.209
On 3 June the Council replied that they had not wished to
borrow money but to buy money for tin, lead and bell metal.

On June

11th the Council instructed Dansell to drop the matter with Tuch er
if he would not let the king have money except on interest and then
demanded that he attempt to get Tucher to accept commodities in
payment of his Tucher's debt due in September.

If this were

unacceptable, Dansell was to extend the loan for another year at the
lowest interest rate possible.210
Dansell's

negotiations

with

Tucher proved

fruitless.

On

September 11th 1549 the loan appears to have been replaced with a
new loan from the Fuggers for 328,800 florins to be repaid August
15, 1550.211

The sudden doubling in the basic indebtedness was

undoubtedly the result of the French declaration of war and invasion
of the Boulonnais, August 8, 1549.
widespread insurrection

in

This disaster coupled with

England led to

Somerset's

fall

and

replacement by Hertford, soon to be Northumberland, in October
1549.212

209Turnbull, Calendar, Mary, 155.
210Jbid, 161, 164.
211Jbid, 199, 207.
212wernham, Before the Armada, pp. 177-178.

CHAPTER VII

THE FLANDERS DEBT
1550-1557
Northumberland's rise to power began a period of retrenchment
in the government's finances.

In April 1550 the Council ordered

Dansell to prolong the debt due May 15, 1550 for another year.
was

to

accept

the

condition

of purchasing

gunpowder at 50s the kintall for renewal.213

2400

He

kintalls

of

A further loan was

taken from Erasmus Schetz on 5 May 1550 of 107,520 florins to be
repaid May 15, 1551.214
coming

due in

May

With both the Schetz and the Fugger debt
1551

the government's

obligations in the

Netherlands stood at at least 500,000 florins (£167,000 Fl.) with no
visible means of repayment.
On March 23, 1551 a major refunding of the debt was achieved
through the Fugger.

It provided for the Fugger to pay the Schetz

£42,090 Fl. on May 15, 1551.

That amounted to approximately

125,000 florins for an effective interest rate on the Schetz loan of
nearly 173 .21s

The king was to repay the Fugger in one year with 8 %

interest on the amount paid to the Schetz.

The sum of £38,976 Fl.

213APC,n. s. II, 426; Journal Edward VI, 18.
214Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 87 cites State Papers
Domestic, IV, no 5.
215Given that the loan of May 1550 was the only outstanding debt to Schetz.
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owing to the Fugger was extended for one year at 12 % interest.

In

return for the Fugger's assistance the king purchased jewels worth
£33,333 6s 8d Fl. to be paid for in Antwerp in 11 months without
interest; 12,000 marks weight of silver for just over £30,000 Fl. to
be paid in August; and £14,000 Fl. of fustians to be sold in England,
payable in Antwerp in April 1552 without interest.216
last loan of Daunsell's period as king's agent.

This was the

He was discharged

April 15, 1551.
It is clear that the Fugger loan of March supplied the mint with

much of the specie for the final debased issues of silver coin.

Two

mints, Southwark and Tower I issued coin between April 1st and
July 31st 1551.

Together they produced coin to the face value of

nearly £173,000.217 This would have required approximately 12,000
lbs of fine silver.218

The Fugger loan, given an 8oz. Troy mark would

have supplied 2/3 of the total.
The

crown

debt

in

Antwerp

stood

at

Flemish, £58,000 higher than in January 1547 .219
situation was critical.

at

least

£158,000

The government's

The mint could no longer be a source of

significant revenue as it had resumed minting high standard coin m
216F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", pp. 86-87; this loan is
typical of Fugger activity in the early 1550s. There appears to have been a change
from loaning goods as a means of making a profit to loaning goods as a means of
gaining coin. In April 1551 the Fuggers had made a substantial loan to the Emperor by
issuing bonds on their firm which Charles V discounted through Wolf Haller von
Hallerstein. Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance. pp. 105-106.
217challis, "The Debasement", pp. 460, 465.
218Gould, The Great Debasement p. 11.
219This is almost assuredly too little.
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September 1551.220

The political situation precluded any maJor

effort toward taxation.

To make matters worse the exchange rate

had gone into collapse at the end of 1550.

Between June 1550 and

July 1551 the £ sterling fell from 19s 5 l/2d Fl. to 12s 9d Fl., a fall
of over a third in 14 months.221
approximately 50%

That is the debt had increased by

in sterling terms.

The ability

to profitably

service debt by borrowing specie in Antwerp for the mint was gone.
To a major extent this was self inflicted damage.222

The

rumors of a calling down of the coin created a flight out of English
com.

The calling down began in effect with the revaluation of

French gold, August 1550, which put the merchant community on
notice that in English eyes, English gold was overvalued.223

By the

time actual devaluation of the teston to 9d was announced on April
30 1551 the foreign exchange market had already responded by
dropping over 203.

That the announced devaluation was not to take

effect until August 31 created a situation in which English silver
coin could only be acceptable at near post devaluation rates.

This

led to an additional fall which was enhanced by continuing rumors of
a further call down.

The government responded by advancing the

date of the call down to 8 July and ordering punishment for rumors
220APC , n.s., III, 400, IV, 57, 102; For the proclamations revaluing the base
coin and related matters see Hughs and Larkin Vol I, 364, 367, 372, 373, 375, 376,
379, 381, 382.

221Gould, The Great Debasement p. 89.
222see Turnbull , Calendar. Mary I, for Thomas Gresham's thoughts on the
effect of a calling down of the coin.
223Hughs and Larkin, Vol I, 364.
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of further debasement.

This was followed, on 17 August by a further

devaluation of the teston from 9d to 6d.224

With the calling down of

the base currency bimetallic arbitrage was no longer profitable.
The new situation required a new approach to the debt.
period in 1551 there was no chief financial agent.

For a

Sir Philip Hoby,

Master of the Ordinance, and Sir Richard Morysine, and probably
others acted in limited capacities in Flanders.

Dansell was finally

replaced by Thomas Gresham, his associate in the matter of the
bullion.

Gresham moved his family to Antwerp in December 1551 or

January 1552.

He lodged there with Jasper Schetz, who had taken

Jasper Douche's vacated position as the Brussels court's primary
financial agent at about that time.225

This intimate relationship

with the largest borrowing agent on the bourse and a major creditor
of the English crown may go far to explain Gresham's success both
as an advisor to the Privy Council and as a financier.
Gresham's
refinancing.

early

activities

in

Antwerp

focused

on

debt

When the first payment came due on the Fugger bonds in

February 1552 Sir Philip Hoby took £53,500 Fl. out of England to
Antwerp.

To complete the payment Gresham borrowed, at a rate of

73 for six months, £10,000 FL from Lazarus Tucher.

Of this £4,000

went to complete the sum for a debt payment due April 30, 1552226,
2241bid, 372, 373, 376, 379.

225J. W. Burgon, Gresham, p 70; Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, p. 250.
226As it appears that the amount due in February was only £33,333 Fl. the
need for £57,300 is puzzling. Perhaps a portion of the £91,000 Fl. due in March and
April was paid in advance or perhaps there were other loans of which no record
survives. The king's JournaL 66, records payments of £63,000 Flemish to the
Fuggers in February and £14,000 in April.

1I3

£1,000 was paid to Schetz, and the residue placed in safe custody.
At the end of April an additional £14,000 Flemish was paid to the
Fuggers.227

In May 1552 Jasper Schetz was paid £6, 180 out of

money raised from the king's debts.228
There remained bonds due in May for £45,500 Fl. and in August
for £56,600.

At the instruction of Council, Gresham put over the

August bonds possibly on the terms offered to the Fuggers of
payment of £5,000 with the remainder to be carried over for one
year.

He also negotiated an agreement with the Fuggers on the

August loans but it was rejected by the Council.
have exceeded his authority.

Gresham seems to

He had been authorized to put over the

bonds on the original terms without accepting any goods, but had
only been able to negotiate a renewal on the normal condition of the
king taking goods "in fee penny" in addition to the renewal.229
Gresham had negotiated to convert the £56,000 due in August
into a new loan of £52,000 at 12% for one year and the purchase of
two jewels for £9,000.

Separately he had negotiated with the

Fugger an agreement to put over £25 ,000 for a year in return for
taking £5,000 in fustians.
by the Council.

Both of these agreements were refused

Gresham warned the Council of the great damage to

the king's honor and profit to be expected from default and offered

227J. W. Burgon, Gresham, p. 80-81, cites Add Mss. No. 5498, fol 36 h;
JournaL 33, 60, 62, 63, 65; APC, n.s. IV, 27; This was presumably for the fustians.
228 APC, IV, 58.
229J. W. Burgon, Gresham, vol. I, pp.88-92.
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his resignation.

This was followed by a promise that if his advice

were followed "I do not mistrust but in two years to bring his
majesty wholely out of debt. "230
Gresham's advice was to improve the exchange rate by creating
an

artificial

shortage

of pounds

sterling

in

Antwerp,

and

establish a royal monopoly on lead with its staple at Antwerp.
lead staple idea, however feasible, was not acted on.

to
The

The exchange

operation was actually begun in September but soon suspended.
Gresham's idea was to buy up sterling in small quantity on a daily
basis.

By taking up £1200 a week a shortage would be created and

the pound would slowly rise, facilitating repayment of the debt and
reducing the cost of imports.231

While this plan might have worked

over a period of months, the government was on the verge of
suspending payments and probably had more pressing uses for its
limited funds.
Of far more immediate importance was the decision of the
Council to employ more fully both the funds and credit of the
Staplers and Adventurers.

We have seen that as early as 1545

Stephen Vaughn and the Council had considered using the proceeds of
the Merchant Adventurer's sales in Antwerp to service the debt.
had proved infeasible at that time.

It

Now, in the summer of 1552

with the government actually out of money, and about to suspend
payments this plan was revived.

Between July 1552 and July 1553

the City of London, and the merchants of England, especially the
2301bid.
231Jbid., pp. 94-95.
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Adventurers and the Staplers, were to assume responsibility for
funding the debt.
This was accomplished in three steps.

First, the Mayor and

aldermen of the City of London guaranteed loan renewals in April and
September, presumably to cover the May and August bonds.232
was nothing new about this.

There

Second, in July, the Merchants of the

Staple loaned the government the amount of the expected customs
revenues from their next shipping with "some good portion of money
besides". In October the Merchant Adventurers agreed to lend the
king £40,000 repayable in March 1553. Third, in November 1552 the
Staplers agreed to take over a loan of £21,000 due to the Fuggers in
February, agreeing to pay £10,000 before February 15 and the rest on
prorogation, on which they would be responsible for the interest.

In

the Spring of 1553 the Staplers and the Adventurers jointly assumed
responsibility for another £43,771 in debts due to the Fugger, the
Schetz, the Rellingers and van HaJl.233
The crown was only borrowing this money but the debt had
become domesticated.

The claims of Northumberland's government

to having reduced the foreign debt rest on this very thin foundation.
Nearly £70,000 Fl. of debt had been transfered from Antwerp to
London.

It would still have to repaid but the repayment would be m

part political and economic rather than in part diplomatic.

The

repayment included the removal of the Hanse privileges in England,
and the strengthening of the Adventurer's monopoly against English
232APC, IV, 29, 129.
233p. C. Dietz 197, APC IV, 169, 267; Journal Edward VI. 80.
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interlopers.

This policy of effective monopoly of the cloth trade

was critical to Gresham's and the Council's major effort on behalf of
the exchange.234
Next, the Privy Council, following Gresham's advice, used a
different set of measures to improve the exchange and service the
debt.

As we have noted the Adventurers sent their cloth to Antwerp

in fleets twice a year for the Pask and Cold Marts.

Council had the

fleet for the Cold Mart of October 1552 held until the Adventurers
agreed to tender all the bills of exchange from the mart to Gresham
in Antwerp for future repayment in London.

In October 1552

Gresham reported that the Antwerp-London exchange rate stood at
16s. Fl. to the pound sterling.

Gresham took in some £60,000 Fl. in

bills of exchange for redemption in London.

By reimbursing the

merchants at l 9s Fl. to the pound sterling the government not only
made a short term profit but forced up the exchange.
was repeated in April/May 1553 for the Pask Mart.

This maneuver
On that occasion

some £61,000 Fl. at an Antwerp exchange rate of 19s Fl. to the pound
sterling were taken in for repayment in London at 23s 4d Fl. per
pound sterling.

In both cases the government paid the notes in 6

months rather than the six weeks normal in commercial transactions
at the Antwerp marts.235

Thus, the payment of one set of bills

234Gresham himself seems to have been particularly concerned with
interlopers. See his comments to Northumberland on the injurious effect of
"retailers" on trade, Turnbull, Calendar, 655.
235Tawney and Powers, Tudor Economic Documents, II, 146-149; APC IV
183, 199, 204, 267-268.
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matched the receipt of the next.

A permanent loan of £60,000 at no

interest had been transfered to the government.
This compulsory exchange mechanism was, in effect, a tax on
exports which yielded approximately 18 3/4 3 ad valoram in the fall
of 1552 and approximately 27 3/43 ad valoram in the spring of
It was also a long term loan at no interest.

1553.

another 14 3 per annum on £60,000 to the crown.
effects were more problematic.

This was worth
The exchange rate

It is possible but not certain that

the exchange would have improved in any case with the minting of
new coin at higher specie content.

If the entire exchange rate effect

were due to Gresham's and Council's manipulations then the net
effect would have been that the management of bills of exchange for
the benefit of the crown reduced the value of the crowns debt in
sterling terms by approximately 443 between October 1552 and May
1553.
The immediate effect must have been to reduce the volume of
imports

into

England

Adventurer's liquidity.

dramatically

by

sharply

reducing

the

This would have reversed the trade deficit

and created a positive balance of payments between England and
Flanders.

The secondary effect of the improvement in the exchange

may have been to bring an end to the cloth boom of the late 1540s.
The merchants were not pleased.
John,

was

displeased

and

Northumberland's warrant.236
benefited

through

their

Even Gresham's uncle, Sir

complied

only

upon

seeing

Yet, in the end, the Adventurers

enhanced

monopoly.

236J. W. Burgon, Gresham, vol. I, pp. 464-465.

This

policy

of
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supporting the exchange continued intermittently down to the 1570s
as a major, and much overlooked, element in Tudor fiscal policy.
The success of the restoration of the exchange can perhaps
best be measured in the relatively small foreign debt inherited by
Queen Mary.

As we have seen the minimum foreign debt in April

1551 was £158,000 Fl..

Of this £44,000 Fl. was transfered to the

Adventurers and Staplers in the spring of 1553.

When Mary ascended

the throne the debt had shrunk to £ 61,000 FI..237

Therefore

approximately £ 50,000 Fl. had been repaid in the spring of 1553.
Professor Dietz states "This reduction was made by allowing the
payments of various government departments to fall
further in arrears. "238

very much

While it is true that the government's

domestic payments were badly in arrears, the logic of the situation
argues that the Privy Council used its Flemish bills of exchange to
pay down the debt.
The management of the foreign debt in the reign of queen Mary
was, in most important respects, a continuation of the policies
begun under Northumberland.

There were however differences.

As

early as October 1553 the government decided to reverse the policy
of Northumberland's last year and increase the debt.

There were

pressing reasons for this, not least the political decision to cancel
the

remaining

payments

of

Northumberland's

subsidy

and

political importance of bringing domestic accounts current.

the
With

237F. C.Dietz, "Finances of Edward and Mary", p. 112, cites State Papers
Domestic Mary I, No. 14.
238F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 112.
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parliamentary

taxes politically

was really no other option.
Mary's
restored

debt
the

management
privileges

infeasible for the

moment,

there

A second significant difference between
and
of

Northumberland's

the

Hanse.239

was

This

that

Mary

imposed

an

unnecessary strain on relations between the Merchant Adventurers
and the crown, and therefore between the City of London and the
Crown.

The third, and most important difference was Queen Mary's

marnage Philip von Hapsburg.

This unavoidably affected English

credit at a time when the credit of the Hapsburg

lands

was

collapsing.
In

brief,

the

Hapsburg's

financial

deteriorating from the 1520s onward.

situation

had

been

The high cost of continual

wars with France and the Turks and intermittent wars with the
German princes had over strained the resources of the emperor.

Only

the unprecedented inflow of silver from the new world which began
m the 1540s permitted the Hapsburgs to carry on.
m Imperial finance began in 1551

The great crisis

with the agreement between

Elector Maurice of Saxony and the French crown in which the French,
in return for Metz, Toul and Verdun, funded Maurice's war against the
Emperor.
Maurice's spectacular advance into the Tyrol and the Emperor's
flight to Villach exposed the full bankruptcy of the Hapsburgs.

The

emperor, having failed to borrow money in the Netherlands, south
Germany and Italy, was unable to raise troops.

He was only saved

from capitulation by a personal loan from Anton Fugger.

Continuing

2390. M. Loades, Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 195-196; Cal Sp., XI, 315.
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war m Germany and renewed war with France in 1555 brought the
Hapsburgs to the brink of disaster.

The French king raised enormous

loans on Lyons, the famous "Le Grand Parti".

The Hapsburg's could

barely prolong their notes and had to give security for all new
borrowings.
243.

By mid 1555 new loans were costing the Hapsburgs

All revenues were thought to be pledged through 1557.

The

interest on the floating debt of the Netherlands government rose
from £ 285,982 in 1554 to £1,357 ,287 in 1556.

In the Spring of

1557 the Spanish crown declared a moratorium on payments both in
Spain and in the Netherlands.

The Spanish public debt was converted

into perpetual bonds at 5 3 interest.240

Given that the proper rate of

interest on the Spanish debt, after refinancing was approximately
143 this represented a capital loss of over 2/3 on any sale of
Spanish bonds.
The troubles of the Hapsburgs put a very significant strain on
the Antwerp markets.
because

the

south

Coin was in short supply through the 1550s
German

bankers

were

overextended

to

the

Hapsburgs and because continuing war in Germany disrupted their
business.
The English decision in the fall of 1553 to reenter the market
as net borrowers was at least ill timed.
squeezing everyone else out.

Hapsburg borrowing was

To further complicate matters Thomas

Gresham was not reappointed as Agent for three months.

In

November 1553 he was dispatched to Antwerp to borrow £50,000 at

240van der Wee, Antwerp, Vol II., pp. 214-215; Ehrenberg, Capital and
Finance. pp. 275-280, pp. 334-335.
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not more than 123241.

In the interim one Christopher Dawntesey had

been authorized by the Privy Council to take up 200,000 florins
He borrowed from Lazarus Tucher at an effective rate of

(£33,000).
143. 242

When Gresham again took control he found the loan to be

unbreakable and the 143 rate established.243
In December, 1553 Gresham was instructed by the Queen to
raise £100,000 at not more than 123.

This proved to be impossible.

He was instead offered two loans of 40-50,000 Carolus gildem at
153.

Arte van Dale and Pruen offered 16,000 at 63 for six months.

However his commission did not permit him to take up money for
less than a year and by the time he had received permission the
money was no longer available.

The Fugger and the Schetz initially

pronounced

to

themselves

unable

loan

because

of their

large

commitments to the Emperor.244
Finally, on December 24th Gresham was able to inform the
Council that he had succeeded in borrowing 120,000 Carolus guildern
(£20,000) from the Schetz, the Ligsalz and the Fleckhammer at 13 3
for one year.

He asked whether it was enough and requested

permission to return to England to settle his account.245

The Council

24Iw. B. Turnbull, ed., Calendar of State Papers. Foreign Series. of the Reign
of Mary 1553-1558 , (Her Majesty's Stationery Office: London, 1861; reprint
Krause: Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1967), 73.
242Turnbull, Calendar. Mary , 69, 77.
243ibid., 83, 87, 104.
244ibid., 104.
245ibid., 111.
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responded on December 28th that when he had taken up another
60,000 florins the Queen would allow him to return home for a
time.246

In

January

1554

Gresham

succeeded

in

making

an

agreement with the Diodotti of Lucca for 50,000 florins.at 12 %
This loan was delayed for a month by the political uncertainties
caused by Wyatt's rebellion but was available in February.247
The tightness of money in Antwerp was repeatedly noted by
Gresham.

The Emperors demands for money were draining the Schetz

and the Fugger.

Tucher was forced to request new bonds from the

Queen and Privy Council because he had been obliged to loan the
Emperor 200,000 florins and so to keep his promise to the Queen had
had to borrow 54,720 florins from others houses.
to have their own bonds as security

These houses wish

The sums available on the

bourse were now so small that Gresham requested blank bonds in the
amount of £10,000 each to facilitate his taking up coin.248
Given the shortage of coin on the Antwerp market it is not
surprising that Gresham, when approached by certain Genoese in
January 1554, was interested in taking up a large amount of silver
on bills of exchange in Spain.

The Genoese were not the only ones

interested in getting money owed them out of Spain.

The Hapsburg

credit demands coupled with export restrictions from Spain had left
a large number of important bankers with funds trapped in Spain.
The approaching marriage of Philip and Mary offered them an
246ibid., 112.
247ibid., 130, 146, 156.
248ibid., 104, 123, 135, 210.

123
opportunity to convert their bills of exchange on the fair at Villalon
into coin at Antwerp.

By May 26, 1554 Anthony Fugger and nephews,

Gaspar Schetz and brothers, and four Italian houses had all agreed to
deliver their bills of exchange to Gresham.249
The Spanish venture turned out to be a complete fiasco.
Gresham had agreed with the foreign houses and had been instructed
by the Queen to take up 300,750 ducats (£100,000), most of it in
June but some of it as late as October.

Passports had been obtained,

not without difficulty, from the Emperor for 200,000 ducats to be
exported from Spain.

Gresham departed for Spain about the middle

of June 1554 leaving John Gresham and Nicholas Holborne to act in
Antwerp in his absence.

It was not until August that passports were

made available for an additional 120,000 ducats to be exported.

It

was not until November 30th that the first shipment of 100,000
ducats was ready for shipment from Seville.
arrived.

The rest had not

The coin shortage in Spain was intense because the plate

fleet was late.

Gresham was being blamed for the failure of a bank

m Valladolid.250
Eventually all 300,750 ducats were shipped but it is unlikely
that they were available at the mint before December 1554.

As

repayment was due on 235,000 ducats with interest in May and June
the Queen had not had much use of her money.

Efforts were made, by

249ibid., 135, 201. I; The amounts of the bills provided by each are in the
Queens instructions to Gresham are printed in Tawney and Powers, Tudor Economic
Documents, Vol II, p. 144.
250W. B. Turnbull, Calendar, Mary. 297.
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John Gresham and Holborne to prolong the debt.
avail.

They were to little

The Tucher loan due in October was extended with half of the

amount due three months and half in

six months but the bonds for

the bills on Spain were not.251
In Thomas Gresham's absence the crown's agents had remained
active on the Antwerp bourse.

John Gresham and Nicholas Holbome

had borrowed £71,000 Fl. of which £20,000 came from the English
merchants.
loans.

They had expended almost £100,000 sterling on paying

Of this £35,000 had been forwarded by Sir Edward Peckam

from the mint.

These activities left the debt in Flanders reduced by

about

and

£55,000

the

debt

in

England

increased

by

nearly

£20,000.252
Thomas Gresham, upon his return to Antwerp in March 1555,
undertook a major program of debt reduction which was to culminate
in the elimination of the Antwerp debt in
outstanding in March 1555 were substantial.
been £61,000.

1557.

The loans

The inherited debt had

The Dauntsey borrowing from Tucher had increased

the debt by £33,000.

Greshams loans from the Shetz, Ligsalz and

Fleckhammer, and the Diodotti had increased the debt by £28,000.
The Spanish loan had added another £100,250.

Thus the balance

forward plus total major borrowings for the period to March 1555
totaled no less than £222,000.

Of this some £55,000 had been paid

by John Gresham and Nicholas Holbome.

This left a balance of

approximately £167,000 owing.
251,w. B. Turnbull, Calendar, Mary,

332.

2521.oades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 291-292.
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Between March 1555 and January 1556 the debt was brought
down to £109,103.

How this was accomplished is unclear in detail

but clear in outline.

Thomas Gresham again employed the credit and

the

receipts

of

the

domesticate the debt.

Merchant

Adventurers

and

Staplers

to

Professor Loades misunderstands the history

of the transactions between Gresham, on behalf of the crown, and
the Adventurers and Staplers.

Loades says:

"At that point (January 1556), there seems to have been a
change of policy.
Hitherto the staplers and merchant
adventurers had been used mainly to supply short-term
or 'bridging' loans to cover payments to the Antwerp
bankers that the latter had been unwilling or unable to
extend.
In later years Gresham was to develop a
technique for minimizing the effects of a capricious
exchange by using the adventurers and staplers to deliver
money in Antwerp at artificially fixed rates. The Crown
then repaid them in London As we have already seen , a
transaction of a similar kind had taken place in the first
year of the reign, and it is likely that Gresham had, in
fact, developed this 'device' several years before 1558,
when it was first specifically mentioned.253
Professor Loades is quite correct that the loan of £18,000
made by the adventurers, at an artificial exchange rate, was in the
nature of a bridging loan.254

It was not, however, a pure bridging

loan as the moneys were loaned in Flemish pounds and repaid in
pounds sterling at a profit to the crown.
on the date of the "device".
October 1552.

Professor Loades is vague

As we have seen it was first applied in

It was applied again in May of 1553.

253Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, pp. 292-293.
254w. B. Turnbull, Calendar, Mary, 354.

It does not
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appear to have been applied in October 1553, May 1554, October
1554 or May 1555.

It does however look suspiciously as though it

were back in force in October 1555 in modified form.

In that month

Gresham gathered £25,000 from the Adventurers and £13,000 from
the Staplers on the payments of the Cold Mart.

These sums are

considerably less than the approximately £60,000 Fl. in bills of
exchange taken at the marts of 1552 and 1553 but enough to meet
the queen's need for £38,000 to repay outstanding notes in October.
If the May loan of £18,000 and the October loan of £38,000 are

deducted

from

the

£167,000

outstanding

in

March

1555

calculated debt would have been £111,000 in January 1556.
of these loans from

the

If both

the merchants were at the artificial rate

governing the loan of May (21s Fl./£ st.) the actual debt outstanding
would have been almost precisely £109,000 Fl.
No

actual

debt

had

been

eliminated but,

once again,

considerable portion of the foreign debt had been domesticated.

a

The

political price paid for this was paid in advance with the exclusion
of the Hanse from trading between London and the Netherlands in
March, 1555.255
reduction

of the

It would go on being paid through the gradual
status

of the

Hanse

and

through

increasing

diplomatic difficulties in the Baltic, but these problems were worth
it.
In the Spring of 1556 a further £100,000, presumably sterling,

were borrowed from the Adventurers and Staplers to liquidate the

255Bisson, "The Merchant Adventurers, p. 128.
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Flanders debt.25 6

These loans probably carried interest at 8 1/23 2 51

rather than 143 and could be extended indefinitely through taking
new

loans.

In May

1557 the last Antwerp indebtedness was

discharged.

AFIERWARD

The renewal of war with France in 1557 led to a final round of
borrowing.

By Mary's death some £90,000 was owing in Antwerp.258

These sums continued to grow as long as the war lasted. The peace
of Cateau Cambresis, March

1559, ended the Hapsburg Valois

struggle. The Antwerp debt stood at nearly £280,000 in April 1560.
Thereafter it was reduced and domesticated in the standard manner
under the same men who had dealt with it from the time of Edward
VI.

In 1571 usury was legalized in England and the Royal exchange

was founded by Thomas Gresham to perform the same functions as
the

Antwerp

Bourse.

Thereafter

the

debt

was

to

remain

domesticated for the remainder of the Tudor era.259

256cal Ven VI, 338, cited in Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, p. 293.
257This was the interest rate paid on the May and October borrowings.,
Loades, The Reign of Mary Tudor, p. 293.
2581...oades , The Reign of Mary Tudor, p. 420.
259n. M. Palliser, The Age of Elizabeth: England under the later Tudors 1547lQQ.3,_ (New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 294-295.

CHAPTER YIU

CONCLUSION
The finances

of the English government in the sixteenth

century were buffeted by inflation and war.

The enormous pnce

increases reduced the value of traditional sources of revenue while
increasing expenses.
greatest was war.

One of the areas where expense increases were
Between 1511 and 1514 Henry Vlll's first war

with France exhausted the reserves left him by Henry Vil.

Between

1522 and 1525 Henry repeated and completed the process.

The

failure of the Amicable Grant of 1525 demonstrated the inadequacy
of Henry's fiscal system to support major foreign war.
Politically, the period from 1528 to 1542 was dominated by
Henry's marital and religious controversies.

Fiscally the period was

dominated by Henry's need to restore the reserves necessary to wage
major

war

either

defensive

against

a

feared

combination

of

Hapsburg and Valois monarchs under papal sponsorship or offensive
against Scotland and France.

The very large sums gained by the

appropriation of the Church's wealth and through attainder allowed
Henry to resume his wars in 1542.
The attack on France in 1544 in concert with the Emperor was
a marginal military success, a diplomatic disaster and a fiscal
catastrophe.
lost,

and

Boulogne was won, the alliance with the Empire was
English

expenses

of

£650,000

exceeded

planned

129
expenditures by £400,000.

The success of Cromwell's and Henry's

fiscal efforts of the period 1534-1542 were amply demonstrated by
England's ability to carry on alone against both France and Scotland
and attain, if not victory, at least a draw.

The cycle of wars begun

by Henry in 1542 ended in 1550 with England exhausted.

During that

period the crown had had to rely on a number of expedients, chiefly
land

sales,

debasement

of

coinage

and

foreign

borrowing

to

supplement its very inadequate normal and tax revenues.
The Antwerp debt which originated in

1544 as a modest

planned borrowing in anticipation of revenues became an ongomg
feature of crown finances.

In the original Henrician phase of 1544-

1547 it was a source of funds to directly meet the needs of war.
Money was borrowed in Flanders primarily for the purchase of
munitions and the pay of soldiers engaged in operations against
France.

The money borrowed in Antwerp was either transfered to

the treasurers for war in Calais or paid out in Antwerp upon
instruction from the Privy Council.
Repayment was a continuing problem.
were repaid out of domestic revenue.
necessary.

The first set of loans

By 1546 loan extensions were

These required the purchase of goods as fee penny.

Little, if any, new money was being raised.
The situation appears to have changed dramatically in the
crown's favor by 1549 through the exploitation of the differential
between the metallic content of the pound sterling and the pound
Flemish and their exchange rates.

The small reduction in the value

of the pound sterling relative to its metal content allowed the
importation

and

reminting

of silver

from

the

Netherlands

at

130
astounding profits to the crown and very substantial profits to those
tendering

silver at the mint.

This process made Flanders an

important source of revenue to the Protector's government.

The

calling down of the coin under Northumberland put an end to this
source of profit and restored the Flanders debt to its role as a
burden on government requiring reduction.
The reduction of the Flanders debt was accomplished by
domestication.

The City of London, the Staplers, and the Merchant

Adventurers were brought to assume the debt.

The methods of

transfering the debt tended to increase the Merchant Adventurer's
importance as the main source of bills of exchange.

They achieved a

strengthening of their monopoly of the cloth trade while the crown
realized substantial profits which allowed some of the debt to be
retired.
The increase in the debt in the first years of Mary's reign was
ill judged.

Except for Gresham's unfortunate venture in Spain little

money was raised, and, without further debasement, what money
was raised could not be turned to profit.
costing 133.

The Flanders debt was

By borrowings from the Merchant Adventurers and

Staplers the debt was retired between March 1555 and May 1557.
C. F. Dietz has argued that "In the final analysis governmental
revenue systems are efforts to turn the chief forms of wealth of the
country most efficiently to the support of the state, with due regard
for the prevailing political idea or theory.

Their nature varies with

13 1
and

corresponds,

sometimes

tardily,

to

the

changing

economic

development and organization of the country. "260
As we have noted a key aspect of the price revolution was the
nse m wealth of the commercial sector relative to the agricultural
sector.

The traditional revenue system continued to rely on the

agrarian rents and stereotyped taxes which did not reflect this
change.

In managing the debt, however, the Privy Council, Thomas

Gresham, the Duke of Northumberland and Queen Mary found means to
tum the wealth of the merchants to the support of the state.
In doing so they relieved the crown of its foreign obligations
and set the pattern for the final elimination of the foreign debt
under Elizabeth.

This was a major achievement.

Coupled with the

new Marian Book of Rates it restored balance to the fiscal system
and allowed England to meet the crises of the last twenty years of
Elizabeth's reign.

260

F. C. Dietz, "Finances of Edward VI and Mary", p. 71.
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Phelps Brown - Hopkins
Price Index
Year

Index

Year

Index

lSOO
l SO 1
1S02
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1S07
1S08
1S09
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Change in Decade
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107
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116
129
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6.62%
6.62%

Average
Change in Decade
Cumulative Change

Average
Change in Decade
Cumulative Change

148.0
33.09 %
41.90%

1S8
16S
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I71
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248
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Average
Change in Decade
Cumulative Change

lSSO
lSSl
1SS2
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lSSS
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160
136
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2SS

Average
Change in Decade
Cumulative Change

289.2
SO.SS%
177.283
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Analysis of Land Rents
After Kerridge
Decade

1510-19
1520-29
1530-39
1540-49
1550-59

Decade

1530-39
1540-49
1550-59

Phelps Brown
Index
1510-19=100

Herbert Manors
Rents on New
Takings

100
133
140
173
229

100
95

202
210
308

Phelps Brown
Index
1510-19=100

Herbert Manors
Implicit
Average Rent

140
173
229

123
177
232

Seymour Manors
Rents on New
Takings
100
134
144
153
159

Seymour Manors
Implicit
Average Rent
128
144
152

Crown Manors
Rents on New
Takings
100
100
116
117
142

Crown Manors
Implicit
Average Rent
104
112
123

London Shortclothes Exported
Annual Averages
1500-03
1503-05
1506-08
1509-11
1512-14
1515-17
1518-20
1521-23
1524-26
1527-1529
15 30-32

49,214
43,884
50,373
58,447
60,644
60,524
66,159
53,660
72,910
75,431
66,049

1533-35
1536-38
1539-41
1542-44
1545-47

83,043
87 ,231
102,660
99 ,362
118,642

1550
1551
1552

132, 767
112,710
84,968

1559-61

93,812

